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Abstract  
 
Master thesis of Business Administration in Corporate and Financial Management 
Title:          International corporate governance in cross-border M&A, a new 
integrated framework from empirical studies 
Authors:       Shaohua Wang and Yan Liang 
Tutor:        Mr. Claes Svensson  
Purpose:       The aim of this thesis is to construct a theoretical framework 
about corporate governance problems and how they might be 
solved in conjunction with cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions.  
Method:       By combining both theoretical materials and practical 
investigations, we have primarily chosen qualitative research 
methods by demonstrating 5 cases study in total, rather than the 
traditional quantitative research methods. 
Conclusion:    Successful multinational M&A are not easy, there are many 
factors needed to consider for participants in cross-border M&A 
transactions. In addition to traditional corporate governance 
factors, which mainly embody board of directors, managers and 
stakeholders and so on, some other factors such as country norms 
and value, government legislation and regulation, public pressure 
and media are also vital important for conducting a prosperous 
cross-border M&A business. Given the recent M&A failures, a 
further research on this aspect of corporate governance could be 
helpful.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Beijing Huiyuan Beverage and Food Group Co., Ltd. was founded in 1992. It is a 
large and modern group company engaged in producing and marketing fruit and 
vegetable juice and juice drinks. Huiyuan’s juice concentrates, purees and juice 
products have been exported to over 30 countries and regions, including USA, Japan, 
and Australia and so on1. Actually, in China Huiyuan Juice is absolutely in a 
competent leading position.  
 
However, on 3rd September, 2008, it is announced that The Coca-Cola Company 
intended to purchase Huiyuan Juice. The news drew a lot of attention from not only 
the nation but also the overseas. Subsequently, after experiencing the investigation 
from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the negotiation between the two parties, 
on March 18, 2009, the CMC rejected Coca-Cola's (KO.N) $2.4 billion bid for 
China's top juice maker, Huiyuan Juice.  
 
The Coca-Cola and Huiyuan deal is kind of similar with some merger cases happened 
during the recent merger wave, for example, Vodafone-Mannesmann2, Daimler and 
Chrysler, Pepsi-Danone and other M&A activities initiated by Danone in China. 
Although Coca-Cola purchase of China’s Huiyuan failed in the first phase, there are 
still some factors and reasons in common behind these M&A transactions, in addition 
to the grievous shock to corporate culture arose from these cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A). 
 
Different corporate governance systems play a significant role in this kind of 
                                                              
1 Introduction of Huiyuan Group Homepage: http://www.huiyuan.com.cn/en/about/   
2 the takeover of the Germany engineering and telecommunications multinational Mannesmann AG by the 
British‐based Vodafone Airtouch Plc. in 2000. These cases will be described and studied in the following of the 
thesis.   
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cross-border M&A deals, the interests of stakeholders involved into the business are 
an indispensable element needed to be taken into account. Today, there is a growing 
dialogue among the different stakeholders about corporate governance and how it 
should evolve to cope with the increasingly dynamic and global nature of capital 
markets. This dialogue is taking place against a background of legislative and 
regulatory change; the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards 
around much of the world; an increase in the scope of audit and other internal control 
and risk management activities; and increased public scrutiny3 . Good corporate 
governance is a key to the integration of corporations, financial institutions and 
markets, and central to the health of our economies and their stability.  
 
Although corporate governance rules and usages are not generally associated with 
M&A, they apply in these special situations and with exceptional force. There are 
almost no specific corporate rules for M&A except new laws, enacted or pending, 
relating to public companies mainly in tender offer and similar stock exchange 
situations, often prompted or influenced by EU Law4. So far, through imitating and 
referring to EU Law, more and more countries have issued relevant law and regulation 
covering anti-monopoly, accounting, financial statement, auditing, remuneration etc. 
Around 1200 large companies in China have diversified their ownership through 
public listing5. Accompanying this process, in 2002, Chinese code of corporate 
governance was published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission; the code 
is applicable to listed companies including Huiyuan Juice which was published on the 
main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 20076. 
 
Afterwards, the Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, which was 
adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s 
                                                              
3 Corporate Governance: encourageing dialogue and participation 
http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/International/Corporate_Governance_‐_overview   
4 Reinhard Pöllath etc., corporate governance in M&A situations: focus on Germany    See the article which can 
get from http://www.pplaw.de/_downloads/publications/2005/RP‐2005‐Corporate‐governance.pdf   
5 Clarke Thomas (2007), International Corporate Governanace, Routledge. See page 216. 
6 “Our History on Huiyuan’s” Homepage http://www.huiyuan.com.cn/en/about/develop.html
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Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 30th August, 2007, was enacted to be 
effective as of 1st August, 20087. Practically, the acquisition of Huiyuan was the first 
major deal to test China's new anti-monopoly law. We have to say that, the regulation 
of different countries is increasing its own power to influence the process and results 
of international M&A. 
 
1.2 Problems 
Since the available evidence does not provide the final result and conclusion of the 
event between Huiyuan and Coca-Cola merger, in this thesis, firstly we will seek to 
investigate the reasons behind these M&A cases of the recent merger period mainly 
from corporate governance perspective and the relevant factors which influence the 
business form. Special attention is given to corporate governance which generally can 
be described as the relationship among various corporate participants in deciding the 
direction and performance of companies. Take Vodafone-Mannesmann case as an 
example, as Hooper and Gow mentioned, “The Mannesmann takeover demonstrated a 
profound inertia and deep resistance in Germany towards the global trend of 
emphasizing the importance of shareholder value above all corporate objectives.8” 
Owning to the conflicts with equity market based Anglo-American model, there finds 
some problems in German corporate governance system which eventually resulted in 
the demise of control right of Mannesmann, which was once considered as a great and 
successful company in Germany.  
 
Then, given the similarity with the four M&A examples9, we will discuss how China 
Huiyuan Juice Group is governed and managed, thus to exam the role of corporate 
governance in Coca-Cola and Huiyuan event. In China, shareholders are considered 
                                                              
7 Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China(No.68) 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=6351   
8 Clarke Thomas (2007), International Corporate Governanace, Routledge. See page 413. 
9 Vodafone‐Mannesmann, Daimler and Chrysler, Pepsi‐Danone and other M&A activities initiated by Danone in 
China. 
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as the source of power which is enjoyed by board of directors, rather than the 
legislature. This corporate governance philosophy resembles the political governance 
philosophy expressed by the Chinese constitution10. Huiyuan is the first major deal 
which was rejected because of not passing Chinese anti-monopoly law. The problem 
how the Chinese government/regulations influence the corporate boards in China will 
be discussed in this paper.  
 
Given the Chinese special developing circumstance, the development of corporate 
governance in China must be subject to effects and restrictions of institutional 
circumstances and the traditional planning economy model. On the other hand, the 
transition of corporate governance in China is an artificial and mutation process but 
not a natural transition process with the development of modern corporations11. 
Accordingly, in our study, we seek to establish a conceptual framework from 
corporate governance perspectives, particularly in the course of the current transition 
stage and reform process for China. As a matter of fact, Chinese companies are facing 
a great challenge to move from a relationship-based to a ruled-based system of 
corporate governance, abandoning the bond of traditional and political relationships, 
and replacing these with the impersonal rules of governance and institutions12. 
 
1.3 Purpose 
When we consider several of the major merger failures of recent years, we see that a 
common theme they share is poor corporate governance. Patrick A. Gaughan indicates 
that classic failed mergers between WorldCom and MCI, Daimler and Chrysler, and 
AOL with Time Warner merger were result from weak corporate governance which 
needs to be vigilant in monitoring management strategy and merger and acquisition 
                                                              
10 Gang Wei and Mingzhai Geng, ownership structure and corporate governance in China, the article is available 
at www.emeraldinsight.com/0307-4358.htm  
11 Ibid   
12 Clarke Thomas (2007), International Corporate Governanace, Routledge. See page 217 
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plans.13 Furthermore, even successful cross-border merger, Vodafone-Mannesmann 
merger for instance, had also met conflicts between different corporate governance 
systems; which played a key role in the Anglo-American’s challenging of the German 
capitalism structure. 
 
In this paper, by beginning with demonstrating the analysis of 4 cross-border M&A, 
we aim to construct a theoretical framework about CG problems and how they might 
be solved in conjunction with cross-border M&A.  
 
Traditional corporate governance emphasized on the conflicts of interest between 
managers and owners. The controversy in corporate governance nowadays has been 
driven much attention on the increasingly recognized conflicts of the interests occur 
across a wide range of stakeholders: owners with large ownership positions, other 
owners with small number of shares, managers, creditors, partners, employees, 
consumers, competitors, governments as well as the society. In addition, among the 
more contextual and industrial variables that influence the business form and system 
of corporate governance adopted are14 national regional and cultural differences, 
Ownership structure and dispersion, the industry and market environment of 
corporation, firm size and structure, lifecycle variations, including origin and 
development, technology, and periodic crises and new directions, CEO tenure, 
attributes and background. Thus, we believe that an integrated framework of corporate 
governance is eagerly to be defined in activities of cross-border M&A. 
 
We will also test each items in this framework by taking a “on progress” cross-border 
M&A in China Coca-cola and Huiyuan, and provide supplements with new findings.  
 
In recent decades, more and more investors or firms focus growth via cross-border 
M&A activities. China, whom the “the country of future” calls after, has appeal 
                                                              
13 Patrick A. Gaughan, Failed Merger: Failed Corporate Governance?, 2005 Wiley Periodicals,Inc. 
14 Huse 2005:68 
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hundreds of foreign investors for its potential in growing economy, market demand 
and cheap labor costs. However, as differences among corporate governance systems 
and sovereign issues so forth, many activities have proved that making business in 
China is not as easy as investors could have realized. Despite synergies generated by 
mergers might be great for acquirer and the target, the corporate governance systems 
adopted by both and all stakeholders involved are hardly to be neglected.  
 
Finally, we will re-fine the frame work by new findings from Coca-cola and Huiyuan 
merger, to ensure a comprehensive corporate governance framework for firms who 
are interested in or currently working on M&A activities. Besides that, we will also 
provide evidences and resource for further study in this area. 
 
1.4 Delimitations  
The M&A literatures are extensive, covering various aspects of the topic. However, in 
our thesis, we focus on the aspect of corporate governance. Six contextual and 
industrial variables mentioned in Clarke Thomas (2007)’s book are vital important to 
influencing the business form and system of corporate governance adopted, 
consequently we chose several of them which are related to cross-border M&A for 
discussion and analysis, for example, national, regional and cultural differences, CEO 
attributes and tenure.   
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the framework we intend to build up for firms 
who are interested in or currently working on cross-border M&A, should be based on 
more research into previous study results possibly in the form of research papers, 
articles and so on. Since numerous books and research papers are found about 
cross-border M&A, it is not possible to refer to all the previous study papers, articles 
etc, we limit into some of them which is more representative and related. Indeed, 
there are a lot of cross-border M&A issues happened in the world, considering our 
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time and effort limitation, we just focus on  studying four cross-border M &A cases: 
Vodafone-Mannesmann, Daimler and Chrysler, Pepsi-Danone and other M&A 
activities initiated by Danone in China. There are two major reasons about why we 
choose these four cases; firstly, all of them are international and cross-border which 
covered five different countries in the world-England, USA, Germany, France and 
China. Secondly, the four M&A are representative which are often cited as case study 
in many papers and researches. Some of them failed, some succeeded, but behind 
these there are different reasons on corporate governance aspect. 
 
Given Chinese particular business environment, corporate information is not so 
transparent and open as the western countries. In the thesis, when we use our 
framework to test in Coca-Cola and Huiyuan case, sometimes as a result of this 
information mechanism limitation, we can not get certain information on some 
problems, thereby we choose to apply a hypothesis approach to discuss and analyze. 
1.5 Outline 
This master thesis is consisted of 9 chapters which begin with a research background 
and intentions briefly presenting the contents of the study. And the continuing 
chapters present comprehensive analysis as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 Methodology 
This chapter presents the motivation of the chosen subjects. The intention of 
adopting a qualitative research instead of the traditional quantitative research 
methods is explained. Validity and reliability of this thesis is also discuss in this 
chapter 
 
Chapter 3 Hostile Merger and Acquisition and cross-border conditions 
This chapter aims to explain the theories of cross-border hostile merger. In 
addition, contextual and industrial variables that influence the business form are 
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demonstrated in this chapter as well. 
 
Chapter 4 Theory of Corporate Governance 
In this chapter, we will list corporate governance theories and concepts that build 
up the foundation of this thesis. It provides an insight of international corporate 
systems, as well as presents a convergence of contextual variables within the 
system of corporate governance. 
 
Chapter 5 Empirical cases studies 
This chapter presents the empirical findings from 4 cross-border M&A cases, 
including background information, conflict description, consequences, analysis 
and evaluation for each.  
 
Chapter 6 A corporate governance framework for cross-border M&A 
Summarizing 4 cross-border M&A cases study in previous sections; in this 
chapter, we construct a corporate governance frame work which covers 
fundamental theories in Chapter 4 and the evidences from the 4 cases in 
Chapter5. 
 
Chapter 7 Empirical test of framework 
This chapter will test and provide new evidence or findings by a “on-progress” 
M&A in China, Beijing Huiyuan Beverage and Food Group Co. and Coca-cola 
company, in order to refine the framework produced in Chapter 6 to accomplish 
our study.  
 
Chapter 8 A refined conceptual corporate governance framework in 
cross-border M&A 
Following the analysis of Coca-Cola and Huiyuan’s analyzed by the conceptual 
framework of Chapter 6; we have five new findings of corporate governance 
problems besides the issues in the framework. To refine this conceptual 
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framework, these five new findings will be supplemented.  
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion  
This chapter will discuss further in regards of the challenges of international 
corporate governance in cross-border M&A. Final conclusion will provide a 
restructured framework on international corporate governance in cross-border 
M&A, and outline some suggestions for possible further study.  
 
Chapter 2 Methodology 
2.1 Choice of subject 
The globalization of business via M&A over the past decades has spawned a search 
for competitive advantage that is worldwide in scale.15 Despite of this international 
growth strategy, shareholders of both parties focus on gaining at rich premium on 
share price from synergies. However, according to the results of a major new study 
from global management consultancy Hay Group, more than 90% of corporate 
mergers and acquisitions are falling short of their objectives, as companies struggle to 
combine corporate cultures and structures. 16  By having studied both corporate 
restructuring, financial risk management and corporate governance in university 
educations, as well as our personal background, our study of this thesis lays in the 
fields of cross-border corporate restructuring and corporate governance. 
2.2 Build up a framework 
A literal meaning explains, a framework is a real or conceptual structure intended to 
                                                              
15 Finklestein, Sydney. Financial Times Mastering Global Business: The Complete MBA Companion in Global 
Business, London: Financial Times Pitman Publishing. Finkelstein, S. 1999. "Safe ways to cross the merger 
minefield." p. 119‐123. 
16 91% of company mergers fail to deliver, Hay Group press, LONDON, United Kingdom, 26 March 2007. 
http://www.haygroup.com/cn/Press/Details.aspx?ID=10178 
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serve as a support or guide for the building of something that advances the structure. 
A good framework is not a principle that simply provide rationale and legal terms 
when implement an activity. In contrast, it should also educate the users the correct 
and efficient way that help them to achieve their objectives, and produce more 
possibilities for users to approach each component in framework.  
 
According to James McRitchie (1999), “the corporate governance framework is there 
to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for 
the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society" 17  Besides of that, corporate 
governance framework also depends on the legal, regulatory, institutional and ethical 
environment of the community.18
 
In this thesis, we present four cross-border M&A cases study. We primarily analyze 
each case by investigating the reasons and corporate governance problems behind 
each story. Based on the findings, we will draw a corporate governance framework in 
Chapter 6 with intention to serve those firms who hold intentions to implement 
foreign direct investment in M&A expansions. Moreover we will refine the 
framework in Chapter 8 by new findings from Coca-cola and Huiyuan merger in 
Chapter 7, to ensure this framework comprehensive. 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
At the beginning of this chapter, theories and concepts are applied and reviewed in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Thereafter, the role of selected components in corporate 
governance and cross-border M&A theories are concretized and discussed. We will 
apply those theories in this thesis placed on five chosen cases in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 7. The convergence theory including new findings will serve as a framework 
as the outcome of case studies. 
                                                              
17 Adrian Cadbury. 'Global Corporate Governance Forum', World Bank, 2000 
18 James McRitchie, 8/1999 
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2.3.1 Corporate governance theories 
CG Definition  
Corporate governance is one of the most talked about topics in business, indeed in 
society, today. Considering that issues of executive compensation, financial scandals, 
and shareholder activism are all tied up with corporate governance. There are 
different definitions on corporate governance from different views.  
 
The OECD in its 1999 Principles of Corporate Governance elaborated the definition 
by referring to corporate governance structures and objectives19:  
 
Corporate governance is the system by which business corporation are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and 
procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides 
the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.  
 
Good corporate governance is a key to the integrity of corporations, financial 
institutions and markets, and central to the health of our economies and their 
stability20. As Alba Joseph D. et al 21described that, a stronger corporate governance 
environment will reduce the opportunities for improving corporate performance and 
increasing shareholder value. This will reduce the demands for M&A activities, 
including cross-border M&A activities such as the acquisition of US firms by 
Japanese firms. 
 
                                                              
19 Clarke Thomas(2007), pg2 
20 http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37439_1_1_1_1_37439,00.html 2009‐5‐18 
21 Alba Joseph D. et al, ” Corporate governance and merger and acquisition (M&A) FDI: Firm‐level evidence from 
Japanese FDI into the US”, Journal of Multinational Financial Management; 19(2009)1‐11.   
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Four well-known approaches in corporate governance field  
Corporate Governance is a relatively new area for the public, and came into a large 
focus in the beginning of the 90s in Europe, although the development from corporate 
governance can be tracked long before that. This while it rests on old theories, first 
and foremost the agency theory, the stewardship theory, the transaction cost 
economics and the stakeholder theory. In chapter 4, we will outline and explain these 
four theories in order to generally understand and review corporate governance.  
 
Diversity in corporate governance  
Different traditions, values and objectives will undoubtedly produce different 
outcomes in governance, which will relate closely to the choices and preferences 
people exercise in business activity22. Different approaches to business formation and 
the accompanying corporate governance structures and regulations have evolved in 
different social and economic contexts23. Among the more important contextual and 
industrial variables that influence the business form and system of corporate 
governance adopted are:  
♦ National, regional and cultural differences; 
♦ Ownership structure and dispersion; 
♦ The industry and market environment of the corporation; 
♦ Firm size and structure; 
♦ Lifecycle variations, including origin and development, technology, and periodic 
crises and new directions; 
♦ CEO tenure attributes and background. 
We will select several of these six dimensions to study as our theoretical base when 
building a framework from corporate governance perspectives, for those who are 
interested in or currently working on M&A activities. Meanwhile, we also refer to 
                                                              
22 Clarke Thomas (2007), pg262.   
23 Clarke Thomas (2007), pg9.   
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several of these six aspects during analyzing and studying the four empirical cases in 
chapter 5.  
   
2.3.2 M&A theories  
M&A theories are the fundamental framework for cross-border M&A analysis. In 
chapter 3, we will cover the concepts of M&A, the competitiveness theory explaining 
motive of M&A, and value creation theory presenting drivers of M&A strategies. 
Concepts of M&A 
Studying previous literatures, we acknowledged that when one company takes over 
another and clearly established itself as the new owner, the purchase is called an 
acquisition. The target company ceases to exist, the buyer acquires the business and 
the buyer's stock continues to be traded. On the other hand, a merger happens when 
two firms, agree to go forward as a single new company rather than remain separately 
owned and operated, which is more precisely referred to as a "merger of equals." Both 
companies' stocks are surrendered and new company stock is issued in its place. 
However, Gaughan pointed out that in the merger and acquisition field, many of the 
terms are sometimes used interchangeably; the distinction is often blurred in practice. 
Giving the motivations in Chapter 3, we will not distinguish merger from acquisition 
in this thesis. 
Competitiveness theory 
Competitiveness is the key driver behind M&A, and many literatures have already 
indicated that multinational corporations have been seeking for M&A to enhance their 
competitive advantage. Corporations are stimulated by this and construct M&A 
strategies in order to achieve corporate objectives. Therefore in Chapter 3 we will 
explain how competitiveness functions in cross-border M&A. 
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Convergency theories of value creation  
According to Gaughan, Patrick A. proponents of M&A will often point to an ability to 
grow faster and anticipated synergy as the justification for a successful deal. In this 
thesis; we will use synergies, increased market power, control of penetration as key 
objectives that maximize the wealth of the shareholders of corporation.24
 
Gaughan, Patrick A. indicates that synergy is the potential additional value from 
combining two firms which is translated into the ability of a corporate combination to 
be more profitable than the individual parts of the firms that were combined, and the 
major objective that corporation would like to achieve in M&A. 
 
Market power, which is sometimes also referred to as monopoly power, is defined as 
the ability to set and maintain price above competitive levels.25 And there are three 
sources of market power: product differentiation, barriers to entry and market share.  
? Product differentiation can be achieved by extending product line or 
international coverage, and integrated R&D and innovation technology.  
? The lack of significant product differentiation or barriers to entry could prevent 
a firm from being able to raise its price significantly above marginal cost. 
? Through horizontal integration, a company is able to increase its market share.  
 
Control of penetration is applied from a macro-economics perspective in this thesis. 
As industries that have become more concentrated, M&A will create a substantial 
amount of competition that reinforces corporations to further penetrate the market. 
Both suppliers and customers would prefer non-decreased value in changes. In 
compliance with this theory, we will discuss in Chapter 3 the magnitude of 
maintaining the interests and benefits of host country’s suppliers and buyers, and the 
significance in building up their confidence in cross-border M&A. 
                                                              
24 Gaughan Patrick A. (2007),Mergers, Acauqisitions and Corporate Restrcuturings, Wiley, 4th, Page117 
25 Gaughan Patrick A. (2007),Mergers, Acauqisitions and Corporate Restrcuturings, Wiley, 4th, Page 146 
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2.4 Analysis methods 
By combining both theoretical materials and practical investigations, we have 
primarily chosen qualitative research methods by demonstrating 5 cases study in total, 
rather than the traditional quantitative research methods. Although quantitative uses 
statistics and replicability to validate generalization, it has difficulties to respond to 
uncontrolled variables in specific situations. On the other hand, qualitative research 
has the resource in gradual response to the nature of the social setting being 
investigated as its nature is revealed.26  
 
In addition, due to the occurrence time of the 4 mergers analyzed in Chapter 5 and the 
location difference between the authors and the study country-China in Chapter 7, 
secondary data are employed for both case studies. In addition, the availability of 
background information of the 4 mergers analyzed in Chapter 5 is provided in current 
publications, which helped us to retain a very time consuming method.  
 
In contrast, the availability of information on Chinese corporate governance, and 
Chinese firms ‘public financial reports are comparably short and limited. Considering 
those facts, we employ secondary data collected from validated institutions 
publications or concerned official websites etc.  
2.5 Choice of cases 
We have chosen 4 cross-border M&A cases study, some of the cases were failed of 
poor corporate governance; while others were successful in challenging another 
corporate governance system. We use previous evidences from current empirical 
research and literatures to ensure a conceptual framework produced. Coca-Cola and 
Huiyuan merger study was primarily selected from a piece of recent financial news in 
China. After reviewing the merger progress and related articles from the press, we 
                                                              
26 Holliday, Adrian; Doing and writing qualitative research; SAGE published, 2002 
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found that the rationale behind the first failed attempt made by Coca-Cola is fairly 
identical to the arguments in international corporate governance. And the most 
important, we employ “on progress” case study to evaluate the traditional 
cross-border corporate governance. Furthermore, we also apply this case to test the 
framework we retrieved from previous empirical research, to construct a new 
corporate governance framework for cross-border M&A. 
 
Although firms involved in our cases study are dispersed in different nationalities or 
industries, all obstacles that acquirers met after announcements embodied corporate 
governance issues that significantly influenced the progress of cross-border M&A.  
2.6 Comparative analysis 
This thesis is based upon empirical cases study in areas of M&A, corporate 
governance and contextual and industrial variables that influence the business form 
and system of corporate governance. The nature of hostile M&A is explained in each, 
and its influence on all stakeholders. Since all cases in this thesis involved three major 
corporate governance systems, each system is discussed and specified in cases. We 
will also employ contextual and industrial variables into each case to exam the degree 
of their influence on cross-border M&A, and what the consequences each case could 
have had. 
 
2.7 Validity and Reliability  
2.7.1 Validity  
When conducting research, an important question is if the material collected is valid, 
i.e. if the applied “measurement instrument” really does measure what is relevant.27 
                                                              
27 Nyberg M.& Pettersson, “Institutional Investors‐Ethical Criteria and Enforcement Practices”, the thesis is 
available at 
http://theses.lub.lu.se/undergrad/search.tkl?field_query1=pubid&query1=FEK‐00011631&recordformat=display   
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Validity concerns the relationship between the theoretical reference of the underlying 
problem and the operation of the variables to be analyzed in the process of collecting 
data28. In this study, secondary data is used which is collected from previous research 
papers, articles etc. We will select some of these previous study results, which are 
related to our study field and purpose. In fact, these previous studies were related to 
the underlying theory and have been ensured valid by researchers when doing these 
relevant studies. This approach ensures a high validity.  
2.7.2 Reliability 
Reliability indicates how reliable the various sources are. A high degree of reliability 
will ensure that our data is reliable and that is could facilitate the research by 
illuminating the problem. It is a concept that is more important when conducting 
quantitative research, than when conducting qualitative ditto.  
Chapter 3 Hostile Merger and Acquisition 
and cross-border conditions 
3.1 M&A Definition 
According to Gaughan (2007)29, a merger is a combination of two corporations in 
which only one corporation survives and the merged corporation goes out of existence. 
When the two firms differ significantly by size, merger is more appropriate than the 
term consolidation. From Gaughan’s point of view, in the merger and acquisition field, 
many of the terms are sometimes used interchangeably; the distinction is often blurred 
in practice. Gaughan used the term “M&A” in the same breath, even did not intend to 
distinguish merger from acquisition.  
                                                              
28 Ibid. 
29 Gaughan (2007), “Mergers, Acauqisitions and Corporate Restrcuturings”, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. see page 12. 
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3.2 Defining Friendly and hostile M&A  
The legal requirements governing M&A differ regarding whether a transaction is a 
friendly deal or a hostile deal. Among each of these categories, the rules also vary 
depending upon whether the transactions are cash or stock financed. The regulatory 
framework defines each of these alternatives as follows: 
 
• Friendly merger—cash financed. The bidder is required to file a proxy statement 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that describes the deal. Usually, 
the bidder has to file a preliminary statement first. If the SEC makes comments, the 
preliminary statement may be changed before it is finalized. The finalized proxy 
statement is then mailed to shareholders along with a proxy card that they fill out and 
return. Following this, the deal has to be approved at a shareholders’ meeting, 
whereupon the deal can then be closed. 
• Friendly merger—stock financed. This process is similar to a cash-financed 
merger except that the securities used to purchase target shares have to be registered. 
The bidder does this by filing a registration statement. Once this is approved, the 
combined registration/proxy statement can be sent to shareholders. 
•  Hostile deal—cash tender offer. The bidder initiates the tender offer by 
disseminating tender offer materials to target shareholders. Such offers have to be 
made pursuant to the requirements of the Williams Act. This law is discussed at length 
in this chapter. However, unlike the friendly transactions described above, the SEC 
does not have an opportunity to comment on the materials that are sent to 
shareholders prior to their dissemination. The SEC may do so, however, during the 
minimum offer period, which will be described later in this chapter. 
• Hostile deal—stock tender offer. The bidder first needs to submit a registration 
statement and wait until it is declared effective prior to submitting tender offer 
materials to shareholders. The SEC may have comments on the preliminary 
registration statement that have to be resolved before the statement can be considered 
effective. Once this was done, the process would proceed similar to a cash tender 
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offer.30
 
Despite many literatures have distinguished the disparity between a hostile and 
friendly M&A, because of increased application of financial resources by threatened 
corporations, antitakeover defenses became quite elaborate and more difficult to 
penetrate. As described in next section, in respect of increasing antitakeover activities 
after fifth merger waves early 1990s31, M&A tactics have developed fast to against 
targets’ protection. In addition, in order to avoid negative connotations, bidders 
sometimes contract with the targets by determining the deal with a “friendly” term. As 
a consequence, nowadays there is no long a clear borderline between hostile takeover 
and friendly takeovers. Therefore, in this thesis, we will not distinct the type of 
takeovers in each case study. 
3.3 Disparity between Merger and Acquisition 
By further studying some literatures, we acknowledged that when one company takes 
over another and clearly established itself as the new owner, the purchase is called an 
acquisition. From a legal point of view, the target company ceases to exist, the buyer 
"swallows" the business and the buyer's stock continues to be traded. Whereas, a 
merger happens when two firms, often of about the same size, agree to go forward as 
a single new company rather than remain separately owned and operated. This kind of 
action is more precisely referred to as a "merger of equals." Both companies' stocks 
are surrendered and new company stock is issued in its place. For example, both 
Daimler-Benz and Chrysler ceased to exist when the two firms merged, and a new 
company, DaimlerChrysler, was created. 
                                                              
30 Gaughan (2007), “Mergers, Acauqisitions and Corporate Restrcuturings”, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Chapter 3 
Legal Framework, Page69 
31 Gaughan (2007), “Mergers, Acauqisitions and Corporate Restrcuturings”, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Chapter 2 
History of Mergers, Page 29 
  26
3.4 Phraseological M&A in this thesis 
However, actual mergers of equals don't happen very often. Usually, one company 
will buy another and, as part of the deal's terms, simply allow the acquired firm to 
proclaim that the action is a merger of equals, even if it's technically an acquisition. 
Being bought out often carries negative connotations, therefore, by describing the deal 
as a merger, deal makers and top managers try to make the takeover more palatable. 
Moreover, an acquisition is also named a merger when both CEOs agree that joining 
together is in the best interest of both of their companies. But when the deal is 
unfriendly - that is, when the target company does not want to be purchased - it is 
always regarded as an acquisition.  
 
Therefore, whether a purchase is considered a merger or an acquisition actually 
depends on whether the purchase is friendly or hostile and how it is announced. In our 
thesis, we will follow Gaughan and not to distinguish between merger and acquisition, 
considering them synonymous.  
3.5 Motives for M&A - competitiveness theory 
Many literatures have indicated that multinational corporations have been seeking for 
M&A to enhance their competitive advantage, in other words competitiveness is the 
pushing hand behind M&A.  
 
Competitiveness in a specific country or industry results from convergence of the 
management practices and organizational modes favoured in the country and the 
sources of competitive advantage in the country or industry. Countries also differ 
remarkably in the goal that companies and individuals seek to achieve. On the other 
hand, the goals a nation’s institutions and values set for individuals and companies, 
and the prestige it attaches to certain industries, guide the flow of capital and human 
resources which directly affects the competitive performance of certain industries. In 
  27
addition, the emerged global and local rivals are in a final and powerful stimulus to 
the creation and persistence of competitive advantage.  
 
Therefore, we conclude that in cross-border M&A, synergies, increased market power, 
control of suppliers and buyers, are the key motives that maximize the wealth of the 
shareholders of corporation.32
3.6 M&A Strategies - Convergency theories of value creation 
Doukas and Travlos found that, unlike many domestic acquisitions, acquirers enjoyed 
positive (although not statistically significant) returns when they acquired targets in 
countries in which they did not previously have operations. Interestingly, the returns 
were negative (although also not statistically significant) when the acquirers already 
had operations in these foreign countries.33 When the company is already in the 
market, and presumably has already exploited some of the gains that can be realized, 
then investors may be less sanguine about the gains that may be realized through an 
increased presence in this same region. Gaughan, Patrick A. states that, proponents of 
M&A will often point to an ability to grow faster and anticipated synergy as the 
justification for a successful deal.34 Therefore, it is conclude that the M&A strategy 
including operating and financial synergy, market power, and control of suppliers and 
buyers are explored as following, 
Synergy 
Gaughan, Patrick A. indicates that synergy is the potential additional value from 
combining two firms. The term synergy is often associated with the physical sciences 
rather than with economics or finance. It refers to the type of reactions that occur 
when two substances or factors combine to produce a greater effect together than that 
                                                              
32 Harward Business Review, March 2001 
33 John Doukas and Nicholas G. Travlos(1988), “The Effect of Corporate Multinationalism on Shareholder’s 
Wealth,”Journal of Finance, 43, 1161–1175. 
34 Gaughan Patrick A. (2007),Mergers, Acauqisitions and Corporate Restrcuturings, Wiley, 4th Edition.Chapter 4, 
See page 117 
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which the sum of the two operating independently could account for. In mergers this 
translates into the ability of a corporate combination to be more profitable than the 
individual parts of the firms that were combined, which is the major objective that 
corporation would like to achieve in M&A. 
 
He concluded that there are two main types of synergy which are operating synergy 
and financial synergy. Operating synergy comes in two forms: revenue enhancements 
and cost reductions. These revenue enhancements and efficiency gains or operating 
economies may be derived in horizontal or vertical mergers. Financial synergy refers 
to the possibility that the cost of capital may be lowered by combining one or more 
companies.35
 
The anticipated existence of synergistic benefits allows firms to incur the expenses of 
the acquisition process and still be able to afford to give target shareholders a 
premium for their shares. 
Market power 
Market power, which sometimes is referred as monopoly power, is defined as the 
ability to set and maintain price above competitive levels. Because in the long run 
sellers in a competitive industry only earn a normal return and do not earn “economic 
rent,” competitive firms set price equal to marginal cost.  
 
According to Gaughan, Patrick A., there are three sources of market power: product 
differentiation, barriers to entry and market share. Product differentiation can be 
achieved by extending product line or international coverage, and integrated R&D and 
innovation technology. Secondly, through horizontal integration, a company is able to 
increase its market share. Thirdly, it could be the case that even with a substantial 
increase in market share, the lack of significant product differentiation or barriers to 
                                                              
35 Gaughan (2007), “Mergers, Acauqisitions and Corporate Restrcuturings”, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. see page 12. 
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entry could prevent a firm from being able to raise its price significantly above 
marginal cost. Even in industries that have become more concentrated, there may be a 
substantial amount of competition. 
Control of penetration 
As more and more parties join together in form of M&A, industries have become 
more concentrated, a substantial amount of competition reinforce corporations to 
further penetrate the market. In order to see the effect of competition on M&A and 
gain the control of penetration among others, corporation need to see whether they 
manage the interests and benefits of external stakeholders such as customers, 
suppliers.  
 
Customers may obtain better deals than their rivals (where customers are not end 
users but rather compete with each other).36 Secondly, customers tend to avoid 
adjustment costs associated with changes in restructured firm operations.37 On the 
other hand, in industries where customers are less sophisticated, their opposition to 
mergers may be based more on fears about change or uncertainty. 
 
To obtain a competitive position, corporations should also understand interest and 
benefits of suppliers in host country, and build up their confidence in cross-border 
M&A. They are interested in the continuance of the company treat their suppliers with 
understanding and ensure that they settle their debts on time to maintain the 
confidence of these providers. 
 
Therefore, good strategy in convincing them not only including the pricing strategy 
                                                              
36 Joseph Farrell (2004), Listening to Interested Parties in Antitrust Investigations: Competitors, 
Customers, Complementors, and Relativity, ANTITRUST. 
37 Robert H. Lande & James A. Langenfeld (1998), Recent Trends in Merger Enforcement in the United 
States: The Increasing Impact of Economic Analysis, 15 NIHON U. COMP. L.J. 73, 94. 
  30
and costs management, but also maintaining a sustaining friendly relationship by 
building up their confidence of the M&A. 
Conclusion 
Giving all M&A theories presented above, although corporations often put plenty of 
efforts on M&A strategies, corporate governance will be the prerequisites for success 
of the deal, and currently there is not a corporate governance framework for 
cross-border M&A. In Chapter 6, we will present a framework for corporate 
governance in cross-border M&A as prerequisites. 
3.7 Culture challenges 
Once M&A comes into cross-border scope, financial synergies is not the single 
magnitude anticipation of decision makers, they also expect the harmony brought 
along the corporation with the host’s overall environment, the new elected executive 
structure and integrated organizational culture. 
Culture 
When people talk about culture, it is fairly reasonable to interpret this concept in 
anthropology term, “culture is the foundational term through which the orderliness 
and patterning of much of our life experience is explained”38. Whatever people argue 
about culture issues, there is always something needed to be kept in mind that culture 
relates to unconscious philosophy and norms belong to human’s nature or groups’ 
internal shared and rooted value. 
 
The culture influence of a company’s business globalization can be evaluated 
according to several aspects. Organization’s target market is expanded to a much 
broaden dimension. Facing diversified customer groups and suppliers with different 
                                                              
38 Benedict, 1934 
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culture background, corporate strategies and organizational culture have to be 
adjusted to ensure it remains one organizational identity after integration and do not 
be diluted. Its marketing strategy should be captured by the target market accordingly 
so that the organization follows the norms, moral and regulations of the target market. 
Organizational corporate culture 
In modern society, organizations are more conscious about their competency in 
markets and optimization on operation and administration etc. They make prompt 
changes following corporate strategies, for instance M&A, in order to generate 
synergies and value. However organizational culture is always a controversial issue 
when managing organizational change. Prof. Geert Hofstede, Emeritus Professor, 
Maastricht University concludes that "Culture is more often a source of conflict than 
of synergy. Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.” The same 
issue can be implicated that organizational culture is a magnitude aspect in 
organizational changes, especially in comparable management functions and the 
post-change overall performance. 
 
According to Meadows (1967; 82) organization theory is always rooted in the 
imagery or order and “the development of theory or organization is history of the 
metaphor or orderliness”; and in anthropology term, “culture is the foundational term 
through which the orderliness and patterning of much of our life experience is 
explained”39, the linking of culture and organization is the intersection of two sets of 
images of order: those associated with organization and those associated with 
culture.40
 
Nowadays, in order to surviving in the competitive market and keep competent 
position, many companies choose to expand their business through organization 
                                                              
39 Benedict, 1934 
40 Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, 
Organizational Culture , Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Sep, 1983, pp. 339‐358 
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restructuring- Mergers, Acquisitions and Expansion. Post-combined setting is more 
integrated in many ways, the workforce, the market, its products and customers, the 
organizational values and organizational culture. The integration of two independent 
individual requires identification of a re-formed organizational culture. In addition to 
the effects of mergers and acquisition, diversified workforce after cross-border 
expansion is a significant trigger of organizational change as well. In order to ensure 
different parties or culture groups acknowledge the same value of the new identity 
and hold together, initiatives of organizational culture changes programs are about to 
be launched. 
 
Change of executive board or leadership is another trigger that results in the 
organizational culture changes. Many studies have proved that different styles of 
leaderships generated different images on its stock performance and concerns on 
employees. Therefore, the interests, ideas and ambitions of leadership will affect the 
whole organizational directions, mission, culture and value. 
3.8 Control for M&A  
Corporate governance control 
Despite the pithy statement attributed to Friedman (1970) that the business of business 
is business, which arguably justifies an exclusive approach to corporations, 
multilateral bodies setting corporate governance standards believe that corporations 
and stakeholders must cooperate actively for creating wealth, jobs and financially 
sound enterprises.  
 
An effective system of corporate governance has both internal and external controls 
that have to be sufficiently responsive if governance is to succeed, 
  
Internal aspects include ownership structure, the board of directors and committees, 
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internal control, risk management, transparency and financial reporting.  
 
External aspects can either be market-oriented, or can take the form of credit ranking, 
and/or social requirements. 
 
Due to the original orientation of the Sarbanes/Oxley Law, concentrating solely on 
financial disclosure and given its decisive and tremendous influence on all other 
similar corporate governance legislations all over the world, most writings on 
corporate governance have dealt with solely internal corporate governance 
mechanisms.41
 
The internationally accepted framework believes that corporate governance is about 
maximising value subject to the corporation meeting its financial, legal and 
contractual obligations42, which is well supported by views on the contractual nature 
of the firm. There may be important structural such and cultural factors that may 
make each corporate governance systems to approach the interest of stakeholders 
differently in practice.  
 
Nevertheless, the main objective of the control is to identify and enhance the 
important structural aspects and critical cultural influences that determine the overall 
approach to stakeholders 
Country regulation control 
As an important element of global economic activity, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
has received enormous attention from scholars worldwide.43 And cross-border M&A 
was the main force behind the major rise of FDI around 2000.44 Governments' policy 
                                                              
41 Ahmed Naciri (2009), Internal and External Aspects of Corporate Governance, Routledge 
42 Iskander and Chamlou, 2000 
43 Brander and Spencer (1987), Ethier (1986), Helpman (1984), Hortsman and Markusen (1987), Itagaki (1979), 
Janeba (1995), Kayalica and Lahiri (2007), Markusen (1984), and Smith (1987) 
44 Brander, J. A., & Spencer, B. J. (1987). Foreign direct investment with unemployment and endogenous taxes and 
tariffs. Journal of International Economics, 22, 257−279. 
  34
measures regulating M&A activities affect the welfare of billions of consumers as 
well as the welfare of other economic agents such as employees and employers.45 
Researches claim that the regulatory policies should be subject to international 
negotiations or assigned to higher levels of government.46  
 
Foreign firms are endogenous and can be affected by government policy in the host 
country.47 Only because the host country government uses lump-sum profit subsidies 
to attract FDI in order to maximize social welfare, but also establish legal terms in 
national company low or antitrust law etc. This also infers the issue of increasing 
competition amongst countries trying to attract FDI. The Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIM) agreement that is based on the GATT principles on trade in goods 
and regulates foreign investment, does not govern the entry and treatment regulations 
of FDI. As a consequence, firms who plan to implement cross-M&A should 
acknowledge the target countries’ regulations before entry, since the countries pursue 
local and international policies in order to regulate possible unfair competitive 
strategies in case of cross-border M&A.  
3.9 Summary 
M&A is a mixed of strategy making, behaviors and ideas of parties involved, and 
regulations. As a major international growth strategy, cross-border M&A cannot be 
examined solely as it was a financial technique, corporate governance is crucial in its 
success. In corporate governance the role of the board of directors, they oversee 
management, and efficiency of the boards integrated together are primarily examined 
among others as key drivers on corporate level, as well as interaction among all 
                                                              
45 Benchekroun, H., & Chaudhuri, A. R. (2006). Trade liberalization and the profitability of mergers: A global 
analysis. Review of International Economics, 14(5), 941−957. 
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stakeholders in M&A on firm level. However, when M&A takes place cross-border, 
external control of governance, crash among corporate governance systems, and 
regulation and public effects are crucial facets to be taken into account as well. In 
chapter 5, we will demonstrate problematic track record of 4 cross-border M&A 
transactions, which consists in issues discussed in this Chapter. In Chapter 6, we will 
also further and construct a corporate governance framework for cross-border M&A. 
Chapter 4 Theory of Corporate Governance  
4.1 Theory selection 
The four theories following below—agency theory, stakeholder theory, and 
transaction cost economics and stewardship theory are essential and fundamental in 
the development of corporate governance (Mallin 2004). The theories will be outlined 
and explained in order to provide the reader a general understanding of the overall 
corporate governance. Regarding cross-border M&A, thereby studies on the global 
corporate governance systems and the roles of CEO and board of directors in these 
M&A activities are constructing the key theoretical basis of our thesis.  
 
4.1.1 Agency theory 
An agency relationship arises when one or more principals engage another person as 
their agent to perform a service on their behalf. Performance of this service results in 
the delegation of some decision-making authority to the agent. This delegation of 
responsibility by the principal and the resulting division of labor are helpful in 
promoting an efficient and productive economy. However, such delegation also means 
that the principal needs to place trust in an agent to act in the principal’s best 
interests.48
                                                              
48 Agency Theory and the Role of Audit”,    2005, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England &Wales. ti 
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 In a corporation, due to the separation of ownership and control, shareholders 
(principals) who are the owner of a corporation often employ professional managers 
(agents) to manage the corporation and maximally generate returns on their funds. 
Agents are likely to have different motives to principals. They may be influenced by 
factors such as financial rewards, labor market opportunities, and relationships with 
other parties that are not directly relevant to principals. This can, for example, result 
in agents may also be more risk averse than principals. As a result of these differing 
interests, agents may have an incentive to bias information flows. Principals may also 
express concerns about information asymmetries where agents are in possession of 
information to which principals do not have access. 
 
As a result of information asymmetries and self-interest, “the principals and agents 
effectively have a contract that specified what managers can do with the funds, and 
how the returns will be divided between them and shareholders. A problem is that as 
future contingencies can not be anticipated, complete contracts are not feasible. The 
principles and agents have to allocate residual control rights: the rights to make 
decisions not foreseen in the contract. Managers inevitably acquire considerable 
residual control rights, providing discretion over how to allocate investors funds. 
From this point of view, the subject of corporate governance concerns the constraints 
principles can put on agents to reduce misallocation of investor’s funds.”49
 
Agency theory has been recognized by people for long time and has a practical 
application. In Chapter 5, we will link this theory with empirical M&A cases 
worldwide.  
4.1.2 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory defines organizations as multilateral agreements between the 
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enterprise and its multiple stakeholders.50 There are a lot of different definitions as to 
who or what constitutes a stakeholder, according to Crane A.& Matten D., a 
stakeholder of a corporation is an individual or group which either is harmed by , or 
benefits from the corporation; or whose rights can be violated, or have to be respected 
by the corporation.51 Clarke Thomas divided a firm’s stakeholders into two categories: 
internal stakeholders (employees, managers and owners) and external stakeholders 
(customers, suppliers, competitors, special interest group and the community). Both 
internal and external stakeholders are important and are constrained by formal and 
informal rules that business must respect. From this point of view, “corporations may 
be conceived as institutional arrangements for governing the relationships between all 
of the parties that contribute firm-specific assets.”52
 
4.1.3 Transaction cost economics  
 
A transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. The transaction 
cost is often viewed as closely related to the agency theory and for that reason 
considered as important in the corporate governance context. When rationally 
evaluating a potential transaction, it is essential to consider transaction costs that 
might prove significant. 
 
Ronald Coase (1937) argues that the transaction costs are low when well functioning 
exchanges of corporate activities exist. This regards the gathering of information 
about available alternatives; first to evaluate them and secondly to conclude contracts 
with them. There are economic benefits for the firm to undertake transaction 
internally than externally. Furthermore, the firm will become larger the more 
transactions it undertakes and the expansion will continue until it becomes cheaper or 
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51 Crane Andrew & Matten Dirk (2004), p50 
52 Blair 1995 
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more efficient for the transactions to be undertaken externally. Moreover, he argues 
that firms may become less efficient the larger they become (Coase 1937) 
 
However, Williamson (in Nygaard & Bentgsson 2002) argues that corporations don’t 
have to become less efficient the larger they become since they can choose 
governance structure.  
 
Corporate governance structure plays an important role in a world with incomplete 
contracts, and where agency problems exist. The transaction theory presents, in 
relationship with the agency theory, a deeper understanding for costs, which are 
associated with activities internally in the corporation. The theories can be linked to 
managerial direction and control (Mallin 2004). 
 
4.1.4 Stewardship theory  
 
According to Clarke Thomas, stewardship theory maintains there is no inherent 
conflict of interest between managers and owners, and that optimum governance 
structures allow coordination of the enterprise to be achieved most effectively. 
Managers should be authorized to act since according to stewardship theory they are 
not opportunistic agents but good stewards who will act in the best interests of owners. 
Stewardship theory recognizes a strong relationship between managers’ pursuit of the 
objectives of the enterprise, the owners’ satisfaction, and other participants in the 
enterprise reward.  
 
Stewardship theory stresses the beneficial consequences on shareholder returns of 
facilitative authority structures which unify command by having roles of CEO and 
chair held by the same person.53
                                                              
53 Donaldson Lex & Davis James H (1991),” Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and 
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Some failures of M&A cases were caused by the management or decision-makers 
who did not recognized the relationship between the goals of themselves and the 
interests of other participants in the company. As a result of lack of understanding and 
applying stewardship theory, there occurred that the CEOs pursued their own benefits 
at the cost of others’ interests, and then sometimes both failed at the end. Regarding 
this, evidence will be found in the case study in Chapter 5.  
 
4.2 The global corporate governance systems 
The complexity of corporate governance can be explained through its global 
occurrence including different legal, cultural, ownership, and other structural 
differences. Different traditions, values and objectives will undoubtedly continue to 
produce different outcomes in governance, which will relate closely to the choices and 
preferences people exercise in engaging in business activities. Generally speaking, 
there are four groups of countries where different corporate governance systems can 
be identified54:  
(a) Anglo-Saxon, (representative countries: USA, UK, Canada, Australia, NZ) 
(b) Germanic, (representative countries: Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Norway, Finland) 
(c) Latin, (representative countries: France, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Belgium) 
(d) Japanese, (representative countries: Japan) 
 
The Anglo-Saxon system is a market-oriented system which serves as a mechanism 
for independent shareholders to influence managerial decision-making. The influence 
of the shareholder is strongly institutionalized in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This 
system has adopted a one-tier board of directors, i.e. governance with one level of 
directors, making no distinction but executives and non-executives. The stock and 
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bond markets play an important role but the Anglo-Saxon system is primarily 
characterized by the external market for corporate control, also named as the takeover 
market. As a result, high compensation is based on a high level of performance. The 
ownership concentration is low and the economic relationships are relatively 
short-term.  
 
When discussing the Germanic system, Germany is the country referred to although a 
range of smaller countries are divided into this system as well. Germany has a two tier 
board system, i.e. executive and supervisory board. The supervisory board is 
composed of employees and shareholders that can influence managerial decision 
making.  The banks have an especially important role in Germany due to their large 
block holdings. The ownership concentration is consequently very high and the 
economic relationships are preferably long-term. 
 
The Latin system lies somewhere in between the Anglo-Saxon and the Germanic 
Systems .In France the companies can chose between one-tiered or two-tiered board 
systems. Shareholder influence is somewhat stronger then in the Germanic system, 
than but not as strong as in the Anglo-Saxon. Ownership concentration is generally 
high in the Latin system. Moreover, family owned corporations are very common, 
particularly in Italy and for that reason is the long-term economic relationship 
preferable. 
 
Both Japanese and Latin corporate governance systems are network-oriented, but the 
Japanese board system is rather complex, an informal substructure of the board of 
directors is often constructed. Similar to Germany are the banks and employees 
essential stakeholders. In Japanese corporate governance system, compensation based 
on performance is low, as in Germanic countries.  
 
Cross-border M&A are inevitably related to different corporate governance systems in 
different countries, in Chapter 5, according to four M&A empirical cases, we will 
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study how different corporate governance systems influence the company’s 
governance structure, decision-making and so on.  
4.3 Two important roles 
4.3.1 The role of CEO 
According to Tengblad Stefan (2004)55, the role of top executives is interpreted as 
efforts to manage internal and external expectations. The CEO is viewed as an 
expectation handler. The CEOs have to make their own interpretations about which 
expectations are important to align to, and are trying to reconcile different 
expectations into a more consistent agenda (compare Kotter 1982) that is 
continuously communicated both externally and internally. 
 
The level of expectation creates a climate of impatience inside the companies, the 
shareholders expect superior returns on their investments, otherwise they would never 
have made the investment, and if they believe that the company will no longer 
provide superior returns they will probably sell their shares. The CEOs in their turn 
are evaluated on the basis of how well the share performs.  
 
They were more and more aligned with the idea of shareholder value maximization by 
an ideological commitment, financial rewards and the risk of getting fired. 
 
CEOs have been influenced by the shareholder value movement in a way that makes 
them receptive towards expectations from financial market actors, for example, strong 
cash flows, and large profits. They spend a lot of time communicating with the 
financial market, and sometimes top management can bypass the board. Evidence will 
be found in DaimlerChrysler case study in Chapter 5. Daimler-Benz CEO Jürgen 
Schrempp intended to maximize shareholders’ value and enhance Daimler’s financial 
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performance through the merger with Chrysler Corp. However, finally he destroyed 
shareholders’ value as a result of the unrealistic synergies, mismanagement and other 
factors.  
4.3.2 Role and responsibilities of board of directors  
The board of directors is the fulcrum of corporate governance: the critical nexus in 
which the fortunes of the company are decided. According to Carter and Lorsch 
(2004:67) boards are essentially involved in three distinct activities: monitoring the 
company and management performance; making major decisions; and offering advice 
and counsel to management, especially the CEO. Therefore, three key roles of the 
board can be conceived as56:  
 
1 The control role (dominating role): to hire and fire TMT, non-executive directors; 
monitoring the management of the company and ensuring accountability. 
2 The service role: providing board capital through creation of networks and specialist 
competence; experienced directors are especially helpful to give some useful and 
practical suggestions; financial capital supply; supported by research about SMEs57. 
3 The strategy role: approving and monitoring the strategic direction of the company. 
 
To conclude, on the one hand, the board is responsible internally for the leadership 
and guidance of the corporate entity; on the other hand, the board has a wider set of 
external responsibility, firstly towards investors, “The board is the link between the 
shareholders of the firm and the managers entrusted with undertaking the day-to-day 
operations of the organization” (Stiles and Taylor 2001:4); and secondly towards the 
wider stakeholders who are the essential partners of the entity. 
 
According to some previous research and literatures, it is clear that in different 
companies, the types of boards are also different. There are some factors influencing 
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the type of board such as size of the company, ownership structure, the company’s 
development phase and power, skill and will of the directors. 
 
Regarding the board of directors, we will further explore and analyze what role board 
of directors played in Vodafone-Mannesmann merger case in Chapter 5.  
4.4 Corporate governance in cross-border M&A  
Comparative study examines one source of these differences - national systems of 
'corporate governance' (i.e. the set of mechanisms that control and influence senior 
management). Nowadays, cross-border M&A is the main feature of industrial 
restructuring worldwide. 58  There have been plenty of researches of corporate 
governance in the literatures over the past decade. Accounting scandals such as those 
that occurred at Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom have brought much attention, which 
led to changes in laws and accounting rules in an effort to achieve more accurate 
reporting of financial data to markets. However, governance related to cross-border 
M&A has not incurred the same degree of focus. By understanding the nature of 
M&A and when it comes into cross-border scope, there is still a long way to go to 
investigate corporate governance problems as determinants of successful corporate 
restructuring.  
 
Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals and between individual and communal goals. In cross-border M&A new 
issues in corporate governance are emerged and this area became even much 
magnified. All components selected can no longer be examined individually, either 
merely based upon previous researches. In this thesis, we will begin to investigate the 
problems of corporate governance according to current research on corporate 
governance in cross-border M&A and supplement evidences of new findings.  
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Therefore, our new framework will focus on both internally and externally. The 
internal governance will cover the responsibility of CEO and related issue, 
stewardship policy, self-regulation, role of organizational culture, roles of owners, 
managers and employees as well as their inter-relationship etc. The external 
governance will focus on both bidder’s and target’s country cultures, regulations, 
interests of external stakeholders, and public pressures from both original countries; 
and the conflicts among each.  
 
4.5 Summary  
In this chapter we introduced some corporate governance theories; actually, most 
corporate governance problems could trace back to these theories per se. Firstly, we 
simply introduced four well-known corporate governance theories, which we thought 
is necessary to mention again. Then, considering that cross-border M&A usually 
connects with different corporate governance systems in the global arena, we mainly 
described the corporate governance systems’ characters from four groups of countries, 
Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Latin and Japanese. In the next chapter, four cross-border 
M&A cases will be analyzed which associate different corporate governance systems 
among England, Germany, USA, France and China. Finally, we selected two 
important participants for corporations especially when experiencing international 
M&A --CEO and board of directors, and described their roles and responsibilities. All 
these theories of this chapter would be a foundation for further analysis and studies in 
the following chapters.  
Chapter 5 Empirical cases studies 
In order to build up a conceptual framework in Chapter 6, we not only employ 
fundamental theories in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 on the factors behind mergers and 
acquisitions, but also introduce four cross-border M&A cases study to provide 
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supplement evidence of corporate governance problems in cross-border M&A, to 
materialize the theories and complete our conceptual framework in Chapter 6. 
5.1 Vodafone-Mannesmann Merger  
5.1.1 Background  
In 2000, Vodafone Airtouch Plc took over Mannesmann AG, successfully completing 
the first hostile bid for a German company. In fact the $195billion takeover was the 
largest merger and takeover deal in the world59. Vodafone was able to use the growing 
power of its stock market capitalization in leveraging the takeover of the industrial 
giant Mannesmann which had at the time 114,000 employees, DM 40billion in 
turnover, and was 109 years old. In contrast to the century-long industrial heritage of 
Mannesmann, however, Vodafone was a newer and smaller enterprise with 12,600 
employees, DM 11billion in turnover, and only 15years old60. What was ultimately 
the reason which allowed Vodafone to acquire a much larger company than itself?  
5.1.2 Analysis  
Mannesmann’s loss was firstly attributed to its management. In the union view, 
management had not prepared an adequate strategy that addressed Mannesmann’s 
diverging business areas. Mannesmann management had pursued the telecom 
business at the expense of the established engineering and manufacturing business 
Mannesmann was founded on. However, where was the board when Mannesmann’s 
CEO Esser proposed to change Mannesmann into a focused telecommunications 
company? Why did they not question it in light of Mannesmann’s historical business 
structure and difficulties the firm would face?  
 
On the other side, Mannesmann’s management main defensive strategy during the 
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takeover was singularly ill-conceived when it had a fragmented ownership structure 
and did not have majority support from non-management quarters. Using an 
unreliable partner such as Vivendi to fend off a tough partner like Vodafone simply 
made things worse for Mannesmann. As some shareholder activists accused 
afterwards, Mannesmann’s CEO Esser severely hurt the interests of shareholders by 
spending large amounts in the failed takeover defense. Once again, where was the 
board at this time? 
 
As to the end of this merger event, we have to say that Mannesmann’s chairman of 
management Klaus Esser was one of the biggest winners who received a severance 
payment of DM60 million, which was unheard of in Germany.  
 
With 80 percent of jobs in Mannesmann being in the non-telecom area, unions were 
more concerned about the heavy job losses resulting from any consolidation process. 
In addition to Mannesmann’s changes on its business focus area, employees were not 
so united and creative as before, co-determination was not as developed in the 
telecommunications business. Subsequently, distressed by the rapidity of the 
Mannesmann capitulation, German unions announced their plan for using pension 
funds and employee share ownership to promote employee-oriented corporate 
governance.  
 
There is a dominated opinion that Vodafone was able to take over a German company 
five times its size due to its current market valuation. As The Financial Times pointed 
out, this Anglo-American valuation of companies by the market was a new form of 
capitalism that was alien to Germany. Actually, in this case, two different corporate 
governance systems were the foundation and played a significant role in the 
transaction. The German corporate governance system is derived from its social 
market economy which emphasizes consensus in decision-making, and partnership 
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between capital and labor61. While Anglo-American model pursues high share price, 
regards valuations as the major source of leverage in global expansion and 
consolidation.   
5.1.3 Conclusion 
As Clarke Thomas summarized in his book, the Mannesmann takeover demonstrated 
a profound inertia and deep resistance in Germany towards the global trend of 
emphasizing the importance of shareholder value above all corporate objectives. In 
consequence, at least one approach in Germany is developing a novel hybrid model of 
governance characterized by the institutionalized participation of labor within an 
increasingly open capital market62.  
5.2 Daimler-Chrysler Merger  
5.2.1 Background  
On 7th May, 1998, the CEO of Chrysler Corporation Eaton announced that Chrysler 
would merge with Daimler-Benz. Thanks to a $37 billion stock-swap deal, the largest 
trans-Atlantic merger ever, Chrysler would not "do it alone" any longer63.  
 
Daimler-Benz CEO Jürgen Schrempp hailed the union as "a merger of equals, a 
merger of growth, and a merger of unprecedented strength". The combined company, 
with 442,000 employees and a market capitalization approaching $100billion would 
be the fifth largest automaker in the world64.  
 
However, in 2007, Daimler indicating Chrysler was for sale signaled that the 
partnership was failing. 
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5.2.2 Analysis  
Mismanagement:  
When DaimlerChrysler Chief Executive Schrempp sealed the merger of Daimler Benz 
and Chrysler Corp. in 1998, he told shareholders to "expect the extraordinary" from 
the $157 billion, world-spanning auto company. However, the large loss happened 
during recent years has showed that his grand scheme has proved extraordinary -- but 
for all the wrong reasons. Unbelievably, Schrempp blamed a tough U.S. market -- but 
at the same time savvy Japanese auto makers have increased U.S. sales and produced 
a profit65.  
In August, Daimler paid $300 million to settle a class action that claimed Schrempp 
misled investors when he called the deal "a merger of equals." 66
During 1998-2001, Chrysler was neither taken over nor granted equal status. It floated 
in a no man's land in between. The managers who had built Chrysler's "cowboy 
bravado" were no more. Some remained on staff, feeling withdrawn, ineffective and 
eclipsed by the Germans in Stuttgart. Others left for a more promising future at G.M. 
or Ford. The American dynamism faded under subtle German pressure, but the 
Germans were not strong enough to impose their own managers67. In fact, 
Daimler-Benz was the majority shareholder in the conglomerate. It controlled the 
majority of seats on the Supervisory Board. 
 
Lack Transparency:  
German CEOs, for example, are not required to publish their compensation until 2006. 
Only the total executive pay for a group of top managers must be revealed. That 
allowed CEOs who destroyed shareholder value, such as Juergen Schrempp, to hide 
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behind a pay smokescreen year after year and dodge accountability. Fund managers 
fumed helplessly as the overall payment for Schrempp and his top team grew by 
multiples despite a dismal performance.68
Culture clash:  
Culture clash has been eroding the anticipated synergy savings. Much of this clash 
was intrinsic to a union between two companies which had such different wage 
structures, corporate hierarchies and values. American workers earned appreciably 
more than their German counterparts, sometimes four times as much. 
 
Chrysler and Daimler-Benz's brand images were founded upon diametrically opposite 
premises. Chrysler's image was one of American excess, and its brand value lay in its 
assertiveness and risk-taking cowboy aura, all produced within a cost-controlled 
atmosphere. Mercedes-Benz, in contrast, exuded disciplined German engineering 
coupled with uncompromising quality. These two sets of brands, were they ever to 
share platforms or features, would have lost their intrinsic value. Owing generally to 
brand bias, distribution and retail sales systems had largely remained separate as well.  
 
In addition, there occurred large rifts in business practice and management sentiment, 
although DaimlerChrysler's Post-Merger Integration Team spent several million 
dollars on cultural sensitivity workshops for its employees.  
 
5.2.3 Conclusion  
The DaimlerChrysler merger showed a genuine spirit of coexistence between different 
accounting and corporate governance systems. Under the German system stakeholder 
values encompasses the interests of both the shareholders and employees. German 
corporations have been perceived as relying more on teamwork than on individualistic 
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charismatic managers, which allowed the management board of the company 
exclusive right to manage and represent the company and work independently of 
shareholder interests and supervision 69 . As Clarke Thomas described, “The 
DaimlerChrysler transaction may well establish a model for a German version of 
shareholder capitalism that would expose managers to a new level of capital market 
pressure to perform for shareholders, which would be far more disruptive of 
established patterns of governance and political economy. “70  
5.3 Danone and Pepsi M&A speculation 
5.3.1 Background 
Danone shares had climbed 32% to 96.25 Euros on 20th July from 72.7 Euros on 30th 
June amid three weeks of persistent rumors that the company was about to be 
acquired by PepsiCo. It might be never known that if Pepsi was indeed interested in 
buying Danone, though it would have been a good fit. Danone’s products are far 
healthier than the fizzy drinks and salty snacks in Pepsi’s portfolio. And Danone is 
one of the biggest purveyors of bottled water in Europe and Asia, while Pepsi is the 
largest in the U.S. 
 
On the subject of a hostile bid for Danone, Finance Minister Thierry Breton stated 
that: “France is not the wild west. We have a strict framework of laws, and we will 
ensure that the law is applied so that the interest of employees will be protected.” 
Patrick oilier, head of the economic affairs committee in the National Assembly, 
vowed he would enlist the help of French institutional investors to fortify the Danone 
barricades against the foreign hordes.71 Shares of Danone dropped 9% after PepsiCo 
(nyse: PEP - news - people ) of the U.S. told French regulators that it is not preparing 
a bid for Danone (nyse: DA - news - people )72
                                                              
69 Ibid   
70 Clarke Thomas, 2007, pp398 
71 Franck Riboud, Matthew Gwyther. Management Today. London: Aug 2006. pg. 38, 3 pgs 
72 Danone: Not For Sale, Deborah Orr, Forbes, 07.25.05, 1:45 PM ET 
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 5.3.2 Conflicts 
However, there has been already emerged some obstacles for integration. First of all, 
France government pledged to "defend France's interests", with vowing to keep 
Danone in French hands as it was declared - like defense or the nuclear power 
industry - a matter of national security. As Lutgart Van den Berghe73 demonstrated at 
level 5 in the debates of corporate governance framework, corporate governance is 
therefore viewed more from a macro angle and refers equally to the national, the 
European, or the global level74. 
 
Secondly, Danone’s chairman, Franck Riboud, who took over management of the 
company from his father, has also expressed his desire to keep Danone independent. 
At the time of rumors, a French government-controlled bank Caisse des Dépots et 
Consignations holds a 3% stake in Danone, which isn't enough to block Pepsi outright. 
But France has thwarted other proposed corporate takeovers by exerting pressure on 
French institutional investors, which own 29% of Danone. Another 14% of shares are 
held by Danone managers and the company's treasury and pension funds. Furthermore, 
under company bylaws, a two-thirds majority of shareholders would be required to 
approve a takeover. Any purchaser must alert the company whenever 0.5% of the 
shares are purchased. Failure to do so means a loss of voting rights for two years. 
Second, no single shareholder can control more than 6% of the votes, unless the 
voting laws are changed, and that requires control of two-thirds of the company. That 
means, in theory, an acquirer could build up a 66% stake in Danone but still have only 
6% of the vote.  
 
Finally, The Anglo-American system of governance favors the shareholder approach, 
                                                              
73 Lutgart Van den Berghe, University of Gent, Belgium 
74 Lutgart Van den Berghe(2002), Corporate Governance in a Globalising World: Convergence or Divergence?, 
Springer US, Chapter 1, page 3 
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whereas certain Continental European countries favor the broader stakeholder 
approach. As analyst Robert van Brugge of Sanford Bernstein & Co. in New York75 
says "Not only would they have to overcome political opposition, but there would be 
a very difficult cultural integration,"76.Even if Pepsi surmounted that hurdle, having 
Danone fall into foreign hands could trigger a backlash among French consumers, 
who account for about one-fourth of Danone's global sales. Moreover, Danone has the 
corporate culture of a small company – the employees feel it's their company. Danone 
key managers would probably quit in droves if there were a hostile takeover.  
 
5.3.3 Conclusion 
Instead of speculating the synergies and relationships among participants in 
post-integrated corporation, researchers and the publics concerned with Danone have 
placed their emphasis on the conditions that admit this takeover. Those facets 
involved are essential in success of cross-border M&A with regard to significant 
contextual and industrial variables debated in external control of international 
corporate governance, which includes the role of governments in cross-border M&A, 
differences in corporate governance systems, culture influences and the interests not 
only limited to shareholders but also of other stakeholders such as key managers, 
employees and customers etc.  
 
As to the means of corporate governance in this case, the boards of both Pepsi and 
Danone are not the mere decision makers but also involved other stakeholders who 
came to shove. And the ultimate control will be a hybridized power of those 
participants. When the takeover speculation of Pepsi became zero sum game, it was 
clear that the deal must prefer the interests of major stakeholders over all others. 
                                                              
75Carol Matlack (2005), Could PepsiCo Digest Danone?, BusinessWeek, JULY 21 
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5.4 Danone’s M&A in China 
5.4.1 Background  
Group Danone, the third largest food group in Europe, entered Chinese market as a 
precursor as early as 1987. In the past 20 years, it has kept on investing in all the 
leading Chinese domestic enterprises of beverage or dairy industry stimulating by its 
“acquisition gene” in its nature.  
 
However, in the recent one or two years, Danone has slowed down its pace in M&A 
and expansion in China. Chinese firms’ sense in commercial interest is awaking, with 
considerable awareness of “Industrial Safety” and “Nationalism”. These facts can be 
proved by a major failed expansion attempt of Danone in China. 
 
5.4.2 Conflicts 
In 1996, Danone established five joint venture companies with Hangzhou Wahaha 
Group. Then the number gradually increased to 39. By the end of Asian Financial 
Crisis, Danone offered Wahaha a bid quoting 4 billion Yuan (USD 571.4 million) for 
the merger and acquisition of 51% of the share of Wahaha’s non-joint-venture 
companies that competed directly with those formed in concert with Danone.  
 
As a consequence, on 19th July, 2007 four subsidiary companies of Danone, NOVALC 
Pte. Ltd., Festine Pte. Ltd., Jinja Investments Pte. Ltd. and Myen Pte. Ltd. filed 
derivative actions against Mr. Zong, in all likelihood alleging breach of fiduciary 
duties by engaging in competitive activities that injured shareholders’ interests.77
 
                                                              
77 Danone and Wahaha Sue Each Other for Acting Against Reasonability of Noncompetition, SHANGHAI SEC. 
NEWS, July 20, 2007, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070720/02403803042.shtml     
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These provisions have been denied by Zong Qinghou Chairman of Wahaha. From 
Zong Qinghou’s point of view, the JV products were sold primarily in coastal regions, 
while NJVE products were distributed in China’s interior. And the Jion Venture 
agreement of 1996 was unfair that non-compete terms were not set to restrict Danone, 
and Danone had intention to control China’s beverage market. In addition, this also 
raised the public attention regarding legislative process on anti-monopoly issues 
foreign mergers and acquisitions should go through the anti-monopoly check, and 
China should promulgate Anti-Monopoly Law. 
 
5.4.3 Analysis 
Potential risks lurked behind establishment 
The Joint ventures were formed before the newly amended company law came into 
effect.78 Group Danone and Peregrine Investment Holdings Limited contracted with 
Wahaha and capitalized the five joint ventures with RMB 560 million.79 Wahaha, on 
the other hand, chose to avail itself of a provision in the Company Law that allows a 
shareholder in a Limited Liability Company to meet its initial capitalization 
requirement with intellectual property. 80  However, the mark was originally a 
state-owned asset, which would leave both Wahaha and the other shareholders liable 
for the shortfall in registered capital.  
 
Board, ownership, and control 
The two foreign investors took a combined 51% of the Joint Ventures, while Wahaha 
took 39%, and employees took 10%.81 Pursuant to article 35 of the Old Company 
Law, however, shareholders could transfer all or part of their investment to each other 
                                                              
78 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 23 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, amended Dec. 25, 1999 and August 28, 2004) [hereinafter Old Company Law]. The New 
Company Law lowers the minimum capital requirement to 30,000 if a limited liability company has two or more 
shareholders. 
79 See Danone set to sue Wahaha Over Breach of Contract, South China Morning Post, April 11, 2007, p. B3 
(assuming an 8:1 RMB:USD exchange rate). 
80 Old Company Law art. 25. Cf. New Company Law art. 27. 
81 Wikipedia, Wahaha, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahaha, Dec. 13, 2007     
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without the approval of other shareholders.82 Wahaha failed to realize that when it 
formed the joint ventures with Danone and Peregrine Investment Holdings Limited, 
that Danone could take control of the joint venture simply by purchasing Peregrine’s 
25.5% of the JV and adding it to its own 25.5%, thereby relegating Wahaha from the 
majority to the minority.83
 
Furthermore, according to Chinese Company Law, a limited liability company need 
not contain a board of directors.84 But the primary JVE entity has a board of directors, 
and Danone in all likelihood has used its dominance of the joint venture board to 
appoint an interim chairman to replace Zong,85 because voting rights in such a limited 
liability company are based upon capital contributions, absent contrary provisions in 
the company’s articles of organization, Danone may have triggered the interim 
meeting using that provision based upon its capital contributions to the company, 
which in all likelihood exceed those of Wahaha.86
 
Competition 
Indeed Danone has directed its directors to install Emmanuel Faber, “the head of 
Danone Asian operations, as the interim chairman of Wahaha.” 87 . Up to 19th 
December, 2007, Danone maintained a joint venture with Chinese milk processor 
Mengniu Dairy, held more than one fifth of a company called Huiyuan that is China’s 
biggest producer of juice drinks, and maintained “partnerships with several other 
well-known local firms including Shanghai’s Aquarius.”88 It can be theorized by the 
Wahaha’s stakeholders that, by virtue of its control of the Danone-Wahaha joint 
ventures, Group Danone owed a Wahaha a duty of loyalty that should have foreclosed 
                                                              
82 Transfer to an outside shareholder would have triggered a preemptive purchase right, but since Peregrine sold 
its shares to existing shareholder Group Danone, that right was never triggered. Cf. New Company Law art. 72.     
83 Steven M. Dickinson, Danone v. Wahaha, CHINA ECON. REV., Sept. 2007, available at 
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/cer/2007_09/Danone_v_Wahaha.html. 
84 New Company Law art. 45, 51. 
85 David Barboza, Rancor Level Rises in Rift Over Danone China Venture, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/09/business/worldbusiness/09danone.html. 
86 New Company Law art. 43. 
87 Barboza, supra note 67. 
88 Donny Kwok, Danone Pullout Hits Shares in Top China Milk Firm, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (LONDON), Dec. 19, 
2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/feedarticle?id=7163717. 
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investment in other ventures by holding shares and appointing the same board 
directors in the competitors of the Danone-Wahaha joint venture. 
5.4.4 Conclusion 
Due to potential problems in a poorly-structured governance system in conjunction 
with cross-border M&A expansion, those conflicts occurred will exaggerate the 
complexity of the problems involved. 
 
As reported, Danone did not involve itself in the daily management and operation of 
its China JVs, a strategy that seems to have backfired in many respects. The 
multi-national corporations such as Danone may have missed out its own strategy in 
China and may have lost customers because of media. 
 
On the other hand, Danone’s M&A activities also represent the current challenge for 
foreign direct investment to Chinese firms that that internationalization of business 
entails the separation of nationalism and commercial interests. Claessens and Fan in a 
review of corporate governance issues in Asia emphasize the lack of protection of 
minority rights insisting that most studies do not suggest that firms in Asia are badly 
run, but “the conventional governance mechanisms were weak to mitigate to the 
agency problem, as insiders typically dominated boards of directors and hostile 
takeovers were extremely rare. Neither did external financial markets provide much 
discipline, partly as there were conflicts of interest, but mostly as there existed rents 
through financial and political connections, which combined with the moral hazard of 
a large public safety net for the financial system”89
5.5 Summary 
The empirical data collected comprises of 4 cases study that has been investigated in 
                                                              
89 Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance, Chapter 6 Asia Pacific Corporate Governance P200. 
London and New York: Routledge 
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order to allow comparison and integration, by using conceptually selected and 
theoretical framework in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The information availability on 
each individual case varies, due to time of occurrence and varied major conflicts of 
M&A. We found that corporate governance systems crash, role of CEO and board, 
interests of stakeholders, stewardship policy, culture challenges, government 
regulations, role of media and public ideas have sustaining influence on cross-border 
M&A. In the following chapter, this thesis will go further and construct a corporate 
governance framework for cross-border M&A and refine this framework by new 
findings from an “on progress” M&A in China. 
Chapter 6 A corporate governance 
framework for cross-border M&A 
Summarizing 4 cross-border M&A cases study in previous sections; we construct a 
corporate governance frame work which covers fundamental theories in Chapter 4 
and the evidences from the 4 cases in Chapter5. The findings can be divided into two 
branches, self-regulations within the corporation and external factors. Therefore, a 
conceptual cross-border M&A is systematically constructed based on both internal 
and external mechanisms. In contrast to traditional corporate governance failures and 
related researches on corporate scandals and management failures, this framework 
adopted a comprehensive approach which presents corporate governance problems in 
cross-border M&A and how they might be solved. Last, instead of listing abstract 
theories, this framework will materialize our findings and link them to theories.  
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Figure 1 A conceptual corporate governance framework  
  Merger and acquisition 
Corporate 
Governance   
Synergy Market power Control of penetration 
Problem: Directors are always compliant with management, not 
properly take the oversight role.  
Board of directors   Solution: Directors should remember to ask questions, be sensitive 
to the type of information that indicates increased risks or negative 
trends, track M&A activities of the company they are serving, seek 
multiple sources of information.   
Problem: Audit quality affects the accuracy of financial results, risk 
assessment etc.; Employees if not perform well, will erode the 
anticipated synergy, weaken the market power, even lose 
competitiveness; A reasonless executive compensation structure will 
increase the conflicts of interests between owners and managers, 
negatively affect corporate performance which is related to market 
share, control of penetration  etc.  
Internal 
self-regulation 
mechanism(Auditors, 
employees, executive 
compensation 
structure)  Solution: Companies should enhance companies' internal 
self-regulation mechanism--independent auditors, 
employee-ownership, and maintain a sustaining friendly relationship 
with employees, toughen pay-for-performance metrics.  
Problem: may 
overestimate the 
synergy gains of 
the potential 
merger. 
Problem: 
inadequate 
post-merger 
planning causes 
M&A failures, bad 
performance, the 
decrease of market 
share, shrink 
international 
coverage etc.  
Problem: managers 
always stay on the same 
level, may lead to the loss 
of competitive advantage 
as more and more entrants 
enter such contestable 
markets quickly.  
Managerial 
overconfidence  
Solution: Managers should overcome overconfidence especially in 
high-risk cross-border M&A; board of directors should prevent and 
keep alert of managerial overconfidence.  
Problem: shareholders' different interests, may exaggerate the 
potential synergy, impact the decision whether to M&A or not.  
Shareholders  Solution: More communication with shareholders is needed for 
managers; the decision-making process going transparency is the 
trend to meet the information needs from shareholders.  
Internal 
organizational 
culture  
Problem: culture clash in the combined company may erode the 
anticipated synergy savings.  
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Solution: Managers should recognize organizational culture 
differences and take into account when making decisions.  
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
generating 
synergy. 
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
gaining market 
power. 
Problem: pre-condition of 
controlling penetration. 
Country norms and 
value Solution: management should understand target’s host country’s 
culture, such as value and ethics that will determine the nature of a 
corporate management style, governance and communication 
custom, and decision makers’ interests and behavior etc. to process 
the cross-border M&A smoothly. 
Problem: Almost every M&A activities even not really happened 
(rumors, news, announcement about possible M&A) would induce 
the fluctuation of stock price of participant companies, so would 
financial crisis.  Stock market 
Solution: Company participants should be aware of the reaction of 
stock market as corporations' external control.  
Problem: pre-condition of cross-border M&A. 
corporate governance 
systems 
Solution: management should acknowledge the other firm’s 
corporate governance system base and coordinate its strategy to 
favor the interest of domestic parties, in order to avoid a culture 
clash among different corporate governance systems. 
Problem: prerequisite of cross-border M&A approval. Government 
legislation and 
regulations 
Solution:  cross-border M&A should be constructed or adjusted in 
compliance with the host countries’ regulations. 
Problem: external 
stakeholders' 
behaviors determine 
if M&A gains 
anticipated synergy. 
Problem: entry 
barriers 
External 
stakeholders’ 
opposition 
might dilute the 
market power. 
Problem: external 
stakeholders may fear of 
the change of integration, 
and conserved of their 
behaviors and decisions. 
External 
Interest of external 
stakeholders 
Solution: 
management should 
optimize the 
interests and benefits 
of customers, 
creditors and 
suppliers in M&A to 
save  costs and 
increase market 
shares 
Solution: 
management 
should employ 
product 
differentiation 
strategy and 
sustaining 
R&D to reach a 
dominant 
position in the 
market 
Solution: management 
should build up 
confidences of external 
stakeholders and sustaining 
relationship with them. 
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Problem: pre-condition of cross-border M&A. 
Media function and 
public pressure 
Solution: management should communicate with the media and 
govern itself on its activities, in order to convince the society to 
perceive the corporation and its activities as a “responsible citizen” 
and will not harm the interests and benefits of the domestic parties. 
6.1 Internal governance 
Internal governance comprises the self-controls within the corporate at management 
and firm level. The internal governance is the main dimension in corporate 
governance, which comprises tradition corporate governance theories of agency 
theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and transaction cost economies. 
Conflicts and corporate governance problems raised in Chapter 5 are linked to those 
theories. We concluded as following. 
 
6.1.1 Board of directors  
The relationship between the board and top management is particularly important to 
maintain good corporate governance. “Corporate governance involves a healthy 
balance of honesty and trust with accountability and skepticism.”90 Therefore, board 
members must be sensitive to the type of information that indicates increased risks or 
negative trends that warrant further attention. Of course, M&A activities which to 
some extents are connected with companies’ future fates are high-risky and should be 
paid more attention. According to the theory presented in Chapter 4, board of 
directors must remember to ask questions, be wary of jargon answers, admit they do 
not understand, and seek multiple sources of information-including from outside 
consultants. As reflected in the cases in Chapter 5, there existed M&A failures which 
were caused by the missing of board of directors when some unsatisfied or doubtable 
corporate behavior happened. Directors were always compliant with the management.  
                                                              
90  Roche  Marianne,  “Digging  Deeper  Into  Corporate  Governance”,  Community  Banker;  Dec  2008;  17,12; 
ABI/INFORM Global pg.46. 
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 6.1.2 Internal self-regulation mechanism  
Audit committee 
According to the agency theory, an audit committee seems necessary as a result of the 
relationship between principals and agents. When audit committee performs its duty 
to exam risk issues related to the company’s M&A activities, these may involve 
complex matters that companies face in the integration of multiple technology 
standards, overlapping workforces, cultural diversity and regulatory issues that must 
be dealt with across state and international jurisdictions91. It is particularly vital to 
secure a certain independency of auditors to ensure auditing quality, which affects the 
accuracy of financial results, risk assessment and so on.  
 
Employees 
There are important stakeholders in the firm, such as critical employees, who care 
about its future even if the CEO has short horizons and is self-interested and 
shareholders are dispersed and powerless. Management depends upon employees to 
fulfill the productive purpose and strategic intentions of the company. As a 
consequence, particularly when experiencing large changes such as international 
merge and acquisition, the voice from employees should be taken into account. 
Although they do not have explicit control, they might express themselves through 
withdrawing their contributions to the firm or performing not so well, which may 
erode the anticipated synergy; weaken the company’s market power, even lead to the 
failure of M&A finally. Letting employees own the company’ shares seems a good 
way to align employees’ interests with the company’s, which has already been applied 
by many companies.  
 
Executive compensation structure 
An intellectual executive compensation structure would substantially reduce the 
                                                              
91  LIoyd Karole & Fanning  Jim, “The Audit Committee  in  the Age of Risk”, Financial Executive; Mar 2007; 23,2; 
ABI?INFORM Global pg.54 
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conflicts of interest between owners and managers92. It is suggested to toughen 
pay-for performance metrics 93 . However, in recent years, performance is again 
moving to market-based measures, which encourage executives to pursue short-term 
profit goals even at the cost of companies’ future survival and potential success. There 
is evidence in Chapter 5, once international M&A deals were complemented, and the 
CEO of the target company could receive an amount of money which sometimes is 
rarely large.  
6.1.3 Managerial overconfidence 
It is found that high-order acquisitions are associated with lower wealth effects than 
low-order acquisitions. That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own 
ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals94. 
 
Since a merger results in replacing the managers of the target with the managers of 
the acquirer, the latter are likely to suffer from greater illusion of control over the 
prospects of the merger and to underestimate the probability of failure. In the M&A 
activities, overconfidence is often displayed in two forms: first, a corporate manager 
may overestimate the synergy gains of the potential merger. During the 
DaimlerChrysler case, the CEO Schrempp told shareholders to "expect the 
extraordinary”, whereas, the large loss happened during recent years has showed that 
his grand scheme has proved extraordinary. Second, a manager may overestimate the 
value of his current company. That is, he may believe that the company’s equity is 
undervalued.  
 
As demonstrated in previous empirical case studies, failures to address cultural 
differences and inadequate strategic planning or implementation are often cited as 
                                                              
92 Weston & Mitchell &Mulherin, “Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance”; Pearson Educational 
International , 4th Edition, pg572. 
93 Ettorre Barbara, “The Board in Crisis”,The Corporate Governance Advisor, January/February 2009; 17:1; pg12. 
94 Doukas John A. & Petmezas Dimitris, “Acquisitions, Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias”, Europe 
Financial Management; 13:3; 2007; pg 531‐577 
  63
common reasons why cross-border business combinations fail95. One reason why 
managers did not attach importance to post-merger integration planning is   
managerial overconfidence, which causes people to overestimate their knowledge, 
underestimate risks, and exaggerate their ability to control events. 
 
As a consequence, in cross-border M&A, the problems managers faced are more 
complex, Manager should not perform just depending on his own experience and 
knowledge. The manner of a manager can be deeply influenced by domestic 
governance system, economic environment which are very distinguished from other 
countries. Therefore, the supervisory third party needs to monitor the valuation 
progress, and motivate the manager to take those external factors into overall strategy. 
 
Hence, overcome managerial overconfidence is important in cross-border M&A, 
which may affect shareholders’ interests seriously.  
6.1.4 Shareholders   
A recent survey of corporate directors found that almost 62 percent agreed with a 
statement, “On balance, M&A destroy more value than they create.” There are 
numerous examples of mergers that have gone very badly and an aggregate wealth 
loss of $ 240billion for acquiring firm shareholders from mergers during 1998 to 
200196. In order to get owners’ money worth, there are some issues needed to be dealt 
with:  
 
(1) More communication with different shareholders 
With regard to international M&A, some are proposed in order to prevent companies’ 
short-term crisis such as financial loss, profit threat, cash flows; while some are acted 
                                                              
95 Johnson Keith L. & Richson Cynthis L., “The Global M&A Boom Continues: Are Boards Getting Shareholders 
Their Money’s Worth? , The Corporate Governance Advisor; Sep/Oct 2007; 15,5;ABI/INFORM Global pg.25 
96 Johnson Keith L. & Richson Cynthis L., “The Global M&A Boom Continues: Are Boards Getting Shareholders 
Their Money’s Worth? , The Corporate Governance Advisor; Sep/Oct 2007; 15,5;ABI/INFORM Global pg.25 
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considering companies’ long-term development strategy such as selling products into 
global markets, seeking more market share. Based on shareholder primacy principle, 
it is important to balance the relationship between short-term and long-term goals. 
Moreover, due to shareholders’ different interests, they prefer the company to perform 
in their own interests. Therefore, for example, they might exaggerate the potential 
synergy in order to affect the decision-makers to take M&A, which may meet those 
shareholders’ interests. As a consequence, more communication with different 
shareholders is needed for managers in order to make a right decision in the end.   
 
(2) Go transparency 
Clear communication and adequate information are vitally important for shareholders. 
Especially in cross-border M&A activities, due to different information disclosure 
degrees in different countries, for shareholders, it seems difficult to follow the course 
of M&A exactly and closely. Going transparency is the trend when conducting 
international M&A to meet the information needs from both parties, at the same time, 
to supervise companies’ behavior broadly in order to ensure doing right decisions.  
 
6.1.5 Organizational culture differences  
According to Smircich (1983), on the one hand, culture is viewed as a variable, which 
is the normative “glue” of an organization influencing organizational members’ 
attitudes and beliefs. Culture determines how the organization operates and ultimately 
drives its overall performance and ability to create sustainable success97. As a result 
of the characteristics of cultural dynamics and cultural variety, changing 
organizational culture is seen as very difficult; in some instances culture is even seen 
as beyond managerial control. 
 
Change of executive board or leadership which often happened after mergers and 
                                                              
97Leadership Advantage , Culture Change , 11th May ,2009 
http://www.leadershipadvantage.com/organizationperformance/culturechange.html   
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acquisitions, is another trigger that results in the organizational culture changes. Many 
studies have proved that different styles of leaderships generated different images on 
its stock performance and concerns on employees.  
 
Moreover, regarding cross-border M&A, there always involves companies who own 
totally different internal organizational culture. Culture clash post-merger may erode 
the anticipated synergy savings and possibly incurred some severer problems, which 
finally result in the failure of cross-border M&A activities. Consequently, managers 
should recognize this kind of differences in organizational culture among M&A 
participant companies and take into account when making decisions.  
6.2 External governance 
External governance emphasizes on external legal and economic environment and 
external stakeholders, such as bidder’s and target’s country cultures, regulations, 
interests of external stakeholders, and public pressures from both original countries; 
and the conflicts among each. M&A theory in chapter 3 are applied as fundamental 
idea of the structure.  
 
6.2.1 Stock market 
 
The intuitional response of stock market is seen as a significant way of external 
governance. Almost every M&A activities, even not really happened only a rumor or 
an announcement related to possible M&A, can induce the fluctuation of stock price 
of participant companies.  
 
A number of earlier studies found significant positive price effects of changes in top 
management. Some found insignificant price reactions98. The pressure of external 
corporate control markets usually stimulates companies to perform toward potential 
                                                              
98 Weston &Mitchell et al ,” Takeover, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance”,    Pearson Educational 
International, 4th Edition. Pg 575. 
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higher stock price, for example, to change managers or CEOs. In fact, the reaction of 
stock market is a signal which expresses the wider stakeholders’ preference. In 
addition, financial crisis also could incur the fluctuation of stock price, which seems 
particularly significant during these days.  
 
6.2.2 Country norms and value:  
M&A project is always complex and involves different parties coming to the table. 
With their own unique natures and behavior patterns, culture is the outcome of 
project’s as well. This is the pre-condition which is applied to all cross-border M&A 
activities. Both bidder and target firms may seek for synergies, increased market 
power, and stronger control on penetration; however, culture plays an important role 
for them approaching the domestic market. 
 
Therefore, in cross-border M&A, bidder should acknowledge the target’s host 
country’s culture, such as value and ethics that will determine the nature of a 
corporate management style, governance and communication custom, and decision 
makers’ interests and behavior etc. 
6.2.3 Corporate governance systems 
According to our analysis in Chapter 3, the patterns of M&A activities vary from 
country to country, which lurks interfere or divaricator among different parties. In 
addition, as theoretical evidence provided in Chapter 4, numbers of countries, 
shareholdings being dispersed across a range of financial intermediaries and a 
well-developed market for corporate control goes hand-in-hand with unspecific legal 
terms regarding employee rights in M&A; while other countries present more stability 
in ownership and less of a market for corporate control employee rights tend to be 
stronger. In the case study of Vodafone-Mannesmann Merger, this issue is the major 
conflict raised during the procedure of the merger. Therefore, as a prerequisite of a 
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cross-border M&A approval, corporations cannot just implement pure restructuring 
techniques, but they are required to acknowledge the other firm’s corporate 
governance system base and coordinate its strategy to favor the interest of domestic 
parties, in order to avoid a culture clash among different corporate governance 
systems. 
6.2.4 Government legislation and regulations 
Corporate governance and related government regulations issues are of top concern 
for corporate executives. A countries’ legislation and regulations, such as corporate 
governance code, company law, Accounting principle, Audit law and regulations, 
labor law, should be realized by FID investors.  
 
In poor investor protection countries, corporations may have dominant insiders with 
such as nontrivial cash flow rights and large private benefits in the firms that they 
control. Their high exposure, such as high bargaining power of labor unions, 
interventionist government, may lead them to be conservative in directing corporate 
investment. Second, government often prefer conservative corporate investment and 
reserve much power on constraining value-enhancing corporate risk-taking to protect 
their interests, which may influence investment policy for their own benefit. In some 
countries, regulations also protect the domestic market and firms from enormous 
market control of foreign investors. According to the evidence showed in 
Vodafone-Mannesmann Merger and Danone in China cases study, influence of 
government legislation and regulations in cross-border M&A is significantly 
favorable for domestic stakeholders. 
 
Those regulations will not only protect shareholders of the firms in the host country’s 
and related stakeholders, but also determines the level of riskiness that investors will 
be undertaking in cross-border M&A. In order to eliminate the riskiness, cross-border 
M&A should be constructed or adjusted in compliance with the host countries’ 
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regulations. 
6.2.5 Interest of external stakeholders 
External stakeholder has the same feature as internal stakeholders, yet with no voting 
or decision making right affiliated. In the empirical evidence showed in 
Vodafone-Mannesmann merger, the government and public pressure play an 
important role in the deal. From the research on Danone and Pepsi M&A speculation, 
the reactions of government and other public groups on this rumor had already 
opposed deal before the any official announcement.  
 
Therefore, as the development of the international economy and increasingly intense 
competition, the power of stakeholders, such as creditors, customers, suppliers, 
special interest group and the community, is identical with internal stakeholders in 
decision making progress. 
 
Creditors, suppliers and customers are the key groups determining the M&A synergies, 
while government and communities could eliminate the synergies if they are opposite 
of the deal. Corporations can reach market power and control of penetration if they 
could approach these stakeholders. 
? Creditors dominate the company’s ability to repay their debts, thus corporate 
governance is required to be restrict regulated to avoid scandals ensure its 
financial flexibility in cross-border M&A in order to maintain the confidence of 
these providers 
? Customers’ opinions of M&A though are merely subjective opinions; customers 
typically have their own motives and behaviors and may use merger 
investigations to obtain “sweetheart deals” from their suppliers. As a result of 
these, in progress of cross-border M&A, the external governance should shore up 
confidence of customers that M&A will not change or dilute the consistency in 
their benefits and interests. 
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? Supplier needs be paid in a timely fashion for the goods and services they 
supplied. They are interested in the continuance of the company treat their 
suppliers with understanding and ensure that they settle their debts on time to 
maintain the confidence of these providers. Therefore, corporate external 
governance should ensure supplier with sufficient solvency and sustaining cash 
flow performance. 
? Community stake is in the companies which operate in their region. They are in 
the interest of sustained employment levels and welfare, and act in an 
environmentally friendly way. However, as an social group, community does 
have power to impact foreign investor on approaching local human resource. As a 
consequence, corporations need to be aware that if they are sufficient in 
harmonizing or balancing the conflicts between the corporation stawdship policy 
and the interest of community. 
? Government holds stake in ensuring the companies act in a socially responsible 
way taking account of socially, ethical and environmental considerations, and 
analyzing corporate trends for various purposes such as employment levels, 
monetary policy, and market supply and demand of goods and services. It look at 
various aspects to do with fiscal policy such as capital allowances, incentives for 
investing in various industries or various parts of the country, and of course the 
taxation raised from companies. Since government could be the final decision 
maker of a cross-border M&A in some countries, interests of domestic 
government and its regulations should be acknowledged in advance,  
6.2.6 Media function and public pressure 
Media is on the front line in disseminating impartial news for ethical activities, 
transparency and accountability of corporations, and deliver those information to the 
market. Their public discussions that media creates will influence the public opinion 
from customer groups, suppliers groups, creditor groups and other external 
stakeholders.  
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 According to case study of Danone in China and Danone and Pepsi merger, 
corporation who are undertaking an cross-border M&A may have a risk of 
challenging public ideas and society of the host country, and it will determine whether 
the deal can be successfully accomplished. However, no management prefers to be 
perceived as a destroyer of the social and economic environments, non-contributor to 
social causes, primarily a user of social services, etc. Instead, the management should 
govern itself on its activities, in order to convince the society to perceive the 
corporation and its activities as a “responsible citizen” and will not harm the interests 
and benefits of the domestic parties. And Communication between media and 
corporate bodies through efficient public relations can be vital to ensure sufficient 
governance and public ideas. 
 
6.3 Summary  
Both internal and external governance should be given the same level of attention for 
companies who engage into cross-border M&A activities. As to the internal 
governance dimension, the relationship between short-term gains and long-term 
wealth, internal self-regulation mechanism and internal organizational culture are 
advised for M&A companies to well balance, enhance and recognize. In addition, 
managerial overconfidence is one problem that should be overcame especially in the 
high risk cross-border M&A. In one word, to get shareholders’ money worth is the 
goal of companies’ behaviors. On the other side, external governance dimensions 
emphasis on both the bidder’s and target’s country cultures, regulations, interests of 
external stakeholders, and public pressures from both original countries. Both internal 
and external governance are very important to the success of an international business 
M&A transaction. In fact, it is impossible for us to cover all aspects and build up a 
totally comprehensive framework from corporate governance perspectives. We just 
try to construct a theoretical framework, based on previous theory and empirical case 
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studies in Chapter 3, 4 and 5,  which may be considered as a reference when people 
conducting international M&A activities.  
 
Chapter 7 Empirical test of framework 
This chapter will test and provide new evidence or findings by a “on-progress” M&A 
in China, Beijing Huiyuan Beverage and Food Group Co. and Coca-cola company, in 
order to refine the framework produced in Chapter 6 to accomplish our study.  
 
Beginning with a company profile and history of the deal, readers will understand the 
motives that Coca-Cola’s intention of this deal. However, conflicts rose since 
Huiyuan’s announcement in September 2008, and public voice also holds different 
opinion on this ever largest M&A in China. We will analysis the rationale of conflicts 
in this M&A deal from a corporate governance perspective in respect of all 
components selected. New findings are explored in the end of this Chapter, which will 
be process to next Chapter to refine this framework. 
7.1 The two companies 
7.1.1 Huiyuan 
Beijing Huiyuan Beverage and Food Group Co., Ltd. was founded in 1992. It is a 
large and modern group company engaged in producing and marketing fruit and 
vegetable juice and juice drinks in China with a competent leading position. 
According to the latest data from AC Nielson, Huiyuan Juice has taken 46% of the 
pure juice market share, 39.8% of the nectar market share, and 10% of the fruit and 
vegetable juice market99. It also controls more than a tenth of the Chinese fruit and 
                                                              
99 , Introduction of Huiyuan Group, China Huiyuan Juice Group Announces 2008 Annual Results 
http://www.huiyuan.com.cn/en/about/
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vegetable juice market that grew 15 percent last year to $2 billion.100
7.1.2 Coca-Cola Company 
The Coca-Cola Company is the world's largest beverage company, refreshing 
consumers with more than 450 sparkling and still brands. Along with Coca-Cola, 
recognized as the world's most valuable brand, the Company's portfolio includes 12 
other billion dollar brands.  
Cocla-Cola’s penetration in China 
The Coca-Cola business in China has been operating since 1979 and is well known 
for its sparkling beverage brands such as Coca-Cola, Sprite and Fanta. Coca-Cola 
already claims over half of China’s soft drink market, and around a 10% share in the 
fruit and vegetable juice market, but has yet to make inroads selling pure juice.101 In 
the last few years, the Company has also introduced a number of still beverage brands, 
including Guo Li Cheng (Minute Maid Pulpy) and Yuan Ye (Original Leaf Tea), with 
the objective of offering consumers a wide range of beverage choices. In line with this, 
the Company is seeking to further develop its beverage business through this 
acquisition.  
 
China’s fruit and vegetable juice market grew at a tempting 15% rate last year to 
US$2 billion, even as global demand for carbonated drinks fell. From Coca-Cola’s 
perspective, and buying Huiyuan was a chance to penetrate China’s seductive fruit 
and vegetable juice segment, in keeping with its global strategy of diversifying 
beyond its traditional carbonated drinks stronghold.  
                                                              
100 Ding Qingfen, Diao Ying    (2009), Coke bid for juice maker turns sour, China Daily 
101 Ding Qingfen, Diao Ying (2009), Coke bid for juice maker turns sour, China Daily 
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7.2 History of the deal 
7.2.1 Timeline of events 
? 3rd September 2008, Coca-Cola offered to buy Huiyuan, the nation's largest juice 
maker, for $2.4 billion in cash. 
? 8th September 2008, a group of domestic soft drink makers sought to submit a 
proposal to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in a bid to block the takeover.  
? 2nd December 2008, Coca-Cola and Huiyuan jointed announced that the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce had begun its anti-trust review, which would continue 
until 23rd March, 2009.   
? 18th March 2009, China's Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced that 
Coca-Cola's bid to acquire China Huiyuan Juice Group failed to meet the 
country's anti-monopoly law.  
? 18th March 2009, Coca-Cola Company and Huiyuan Juice Group said that they 
respect the decision of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 
7.2.2 Before the announcement of Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
Huiyuan Announcement of Coca-Cola’s takeover 
On September 3, 2008, China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited (“Huiyuan”; Hong Kong 
stock code: 1886) announced The Coca-Cola Company’s (“Coca-Cola”) intention to 
make a voluntary general offer to purchase all of the issued shares in the capital of 
Huiyuan, all of its outstanding convertible bonds, and for the cancellation of all its 
outstanding options (“the Offers”).  The making of the Offers is subject to 
pre-conditions relating to Chinese regulatory approvals.102
                                                              
102 China Huiyuan Juice Group Announces Possible Voluntary Conditional Cash Offers by The Coca‐Cola Company 
http://www.huiyuan.com.cn/huiinvestor/investor_en/detail.jsp?id=146
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Chinese Ministry of Commerce Anti-trust Investigation on Coca-Cola 
Coca-Cola applied anti-trust investigation to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in 
September 2008. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce officially launched the 
investigation on November 11th to determine whether the acquisition of Huiyuan 
would harm other rivals and consumers rights or hamper technological development. 
Public voice on this deal 
Soon, the deal had been plagued by objections couched in nationalist rhetoric, and a 
poll by Sina.com found that over two-thirds of the 120,000 respondents disapproved 
of foreign investments in Chinese companies, about eighty percent supported Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce’s rejection of the bid.103
7.2.3 Announcement of Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
On March 18, 2009, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce rejected Coca-Cola's (KO.N) 
$2.4 billion bid for China's top juice maker, Huiyuan Juice. This became the first offer 
rejected since China's Anti-Monopoly Law took effect August 2008. As demonstrated 
in the statement from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce “this proposal would have 
an unfavorable impact on competition” and “The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law review 
is meant to protect fair market competition and guard the interests of consumers and 
the public”104
 
The Chinese Ministry of Commerce states on its Web site that the investigation, 
which "exactly followed relative laws and regulations," found the transaction may 
disturb market competition. "If the acquisition of Huiyuan went into effect, Coca-Cola 
is very likely to take a dominating position in the domestic market and the consumers 
may have to accept the high price fixed by the company as they don't have more 
                                                              
103 Public voting on Huiyuan and Coca‐cola deal, http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/huiyuan_2009/index.shtml
104 REFILE‐TEXT‐China's statement on rejecting Coke's Huiyuan bid, 18 March 2009 
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUKPEK259020090318?symbol=1886.HK
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choices"105
7.2.4 After the announcement of Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
Response of both companies 
On the same day, Coca-Cola Company and Huiyuan Juice Group said Wednesday that 
they respect the decision of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce to reject Coca-Cola's 
2.3 billion U.S. dollar bid for China's largest juice maker. "Huiyuan respects the 
decision made by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The group's production is 
normal for the time being," the group said in a statement to Xinhuanet106. "Huiyuan 
will continue providing high-quality, safe and nutritious products to consumers." The 
Coca-Cola Company said in a statement to media that, "We are disappointed, but we 
also respect the Chinese Ministry of Commerce's decision." 
Stock market reaction 
Stocks in Huiyuan dropped 40% the day after the decision was announced, but even 
before that there were signs of trouble. 
7.3 Analysis based on components in framework 
It would have been a corporate integration made by god: A leading Chinese juice 
maker, having courted many suitors, finally found a willing partner who is the world’s 
largest soft drink manufacturer. For the owners and CEO of the Chinese company Zhu 
Xinli, it would mean tremendous billion-dollar compensation. On the other hand, the 
bidder, Coca-Cola Company, would buy its way into a fast-growing and potentially 
vast market segment that it had so far failed to conquer. However, nature of different 
corporate governance systems, pressure from public voice, restrictions of Chinese 
                                                              
105 Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s announcement on Coca‐Cola’s acquisation of Huiyuan, 18th March 2009, 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/c/200903/20090306108617.html
106 Coca‐Cola, juice maker Huiyuan both "respect" Chinese gov't rejection of purchase bid (19th March 2009), 
Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009‐03/19/content_11032929.htm
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regulation, and the dissenting opinion of competitors have negative impact on this 
proposed deal. There were two obstacles that Coca-Cola faced, one is the large size of 
the two companies, which will raise concerns about monopolies, and the second is 
that the brand of Huiyuan is considered to be protected as a famous domestic brand. 
In following sections, we will analysis the corporate governance problems raised in 
this failed M&A based on the constructed framework in Chapter 6. 
7.3.1 Internal governance 
Hypothesis 1: Coca-Cola’s directors are very sensitive to potential increased risks, 
instead of only complying with the management.  
When MOC announced to reject the Huiyuan bidder from Coca-Cola, Coca-Cola’s 
response of respecting Chinese Authority’s decision, to some extents, indicates the 
possibility of the previous rumor that there are more and more opposition voices from 
the board of Coca-Cola, especially during the tough financial crisis. From this point of 
view, the block of Chinese MOC is just an opportunity for Coca-Cola to get away 
from the multinational M&A deal, which might be the desire of these “more and more 
directors” who did not support to acquire Huiyuan Juice Group from the beginning. 
The behavior of Coca-Cola, although the company never admit and always announced 
to the public that board of directors in Coca-Cola would give full support to acquire 
Huiyuan and extend its non-carbonated drinks market in China, implied that directors 
of this soft drink giant are very sensitive to the company’s possible negative trends 
and potential increased risks and keep alert to the firm’s future development, instead 
of solely complying with the top management. We think maybe that is one reason 
Coca-Cola can survive and succeed over past decades.    
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Hypothesis 2:  It is impossible for any CEO to make a decision totally ignoring or 
against employees’ interests, so is in Huiyuan.   
Huiyuan’s CEO Mr. Zhu Xinli had spoken to the public media that the decision of 
selling Huiyuan to the largest soft drink producer is in fact due to the consideration of 
the interests of shareholders and numerous employees in Huiyuan. In Huiyuan, 
employees are encouraged to participant in all kinds of innovation and creation 
activities. A friendly relationship is encouraged to establish and maintain with 
employees. The attitudes of the employees towards M&A issues sometimes are 
decisive to the final result. It is impossible for any CEO to make a decision totally 
ignoring or against employees’ interests, so is in Huiyuan.  
 
Hypothesis 3:  In Coca-Cola’ proposed takeover of Huiyuan, Coca-Cola may 
overestimate the synergy gains and offer a much high price, due to the coming of 
financial crisis.   
Coca-Cola’s bidder of $2.4 billion to purchase Huiyuan is such a good price for the 
target, which is about 3 times as Huiyuan‘s market value at that moment. 
Nevertheless, as one of Coca-Cola’s executives said that, ‘due to the coming of 
economic crisis, Huiyuan‘s stock price dropped by approximately 25%, therefore, 
Coca-Cola is facing large pressure actually.’ although Coca-Cola announced to the 
public that they would not change the bidder price. In Coca-Cola’s proposed takeover 
of Huiyuan, the price of $2.4 billion is really very attractive to the Chinese Juice 
maker, but it also demonstrated that Coca-Cola may overestimate the synergy gains of 
the potential merger according to the pressure which the American company might 
face. We think maybe that is one important reason why Coca-Cola did not response 
actively to the MOC’s decision like Vodafone acquiring Mannesmann. Managerial 
overconfidence often results in a too- high bidder based on overestimating synergy in 
future.    
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 In the event of Coca-Cola’s proposed takeover of Huiyuan, through some statements 
on the possible benefits once the deal came true, it is found that they have primary 
integration plan and implementation strategy for the future after merger. However, 
according to Coca-Cola’s negative response to Chinese MOC, we can suppose that 
Coca-Cola might not be prepared well for the future.  
 
Hypothesis 4:  More communication with the company’s different shareholders 
seems very necessary in Huiyuan, due to different interests among shareholders.  
Coca-Cola’s offer has received support from more than 60 percent of Huiyuan’s 
shareholders until December, 2008107. According to Huiyuan’s ownership structure, 
Danone Group together with other PE funds (Holand Bank and Warburg Pincus 
Private Equity, etc.) own about 44% shares, compared to 41% of Mr. Zhu, it is found 
that the power of control is in foreign owners’ hands to some extents. It is clear that 
France Danone and other PE funds are always interested in getting more returns on 
their investments in short time, disregarding the company’s long-term overall 
development plan. Therefore, for the managers in Huiyuan, to balance the relationship 
between short-term and long-term goals, more communication with the company’s 
different shareholders seems vital important. Indeed, adequate information disclosure 
is the precondition for shareholders to discuss with managers. Going transparency is 
necessary for both parties in order to communicate equally and conveniently.   
Hypothesis 5:  It is not sure that there won’t have culture clash in the combined 
company, owing to the organizational culture differences between Coca-Cola and 
Huiyuan.  
The Coca-Cola Company is the world's largest beverage company, refreshing 
consumers with nearly 500 sparkling and still brands. Through the world's largest 
                                                              
107 People’s Daily Online: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90884/6545019.html (2009‐5‐20) 
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beverage distribution system, consumers in more than 200 countries enjoy the 
Company's beverages at a rate of nearly 1.6 billion servings a day. Huiyuan is one of 
the most successful national brands in China, which has taken 46% of the pure juice 
market share of China. There must have differences on organizational culture between 
these two companies. Huiyuan is more localized to Chinese consumers although 
Huiyuan’s juice concentrates, purees and juice products have been exported to over 30 
countries and regions108, while Coca-Cola is more internationalized and has a much 
stronger market power in the world. There might have controversy in corporate 
visions, values or behavior manners and so on. It is not sure that after merger there 
won’t have culture clash, which may erode the anticipated synergy savings.  
7.3.2 External governance 
Hypothesis 1:  In Coca-Cola’ proposed takeover of Huiyuan, Huiyuan’s stock 
price is affected a lot, which demonstrates the efficiency of stock market control.  
For the initial public offering last year, Huiyuan stock was set at HK$ 6. Since then, 
the price surged to a peak of HK$ 12 per share but started slumping this year. By the 
time trading in the stock was suspended in advance of the Coca-Cola sale 
announcement, Huiyuan's share price had slipped to HK$ 4109. 
China's Ministry of Commerce (MOC) announced Wednesday morning that 
Coca-Cola's bid to acquire China Huiyuan Juice Group failed to meet the country's 
anti-monopoly law. Huiyuan's shares on the Hong Kong stock market were down 
nearly 20 percent110 before being suspended Wednesday.  
The fluctuation of share price could be seen as a signal of corporate performance. The 
reaction of stock market, as a sensitive and effective external governance control 
                                                              
108 Huiyuan ‘s homepage http://www.huiyuan.com.cn/en/about/index.html   
109 Huiyuan ‘s Calculated Deal with Coca‐Cola, Caijing Magazine, 18th September, 2008 
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008‐09‐18/110013755.html   
110 Coca‐Cola, Juice maker Huiyuan both “respect” Chinese Gov’t rejection of purchase bid, 19th, March 2009, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009‐03/19/content_11032929.htm   
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mechanism, has been attracting people’s lot of attention. Huiyuan’s stock price 
changes reflected the situation the company is in now and the prospect of the Chinese 
top juice maker.  
 
Hypothesis 2: In Coca-Cola’ proposed takeover of Huiyuan, Coca-Cola 
acknowledges country norms and value 
Up to this year, Coca-Cola has been living in China for 30 years with its success over 
past decades, and China also became one of its largest markets in the world. This not 
only because of its unique beverage products, but more significantly attribute to its 
localization strategy in China. And this can be proved by its branding in China.  
 
Coca Cola, found prior to the launch of their localized brand identity that shopkeepers 
had made their own signage, approximating the phonetics of the name as best they 
could. The company employed its own localization team of groups of experts in this 
area, and defined its branding strategy in China in compliance with overall corporate 
strategy. This team cleverly fused the transliteration and conceptual methods to come 
up with “ke kou ke le”, which translates in Mandarin to “permitting the mouth to 
rejoice”. Indeed, the concepts of this company and its products delivered to market 
are exactly identical to the Chinese culture.  
 
In other word, Coca-cola successfully got rid of culture crash in approaching the 
Chinese market. This substantially built up a foundation for its further expansion in 
China. Therefore, Coca-cola well acknowledges the Chinese norms and value. 
Hypothesis 3:  In Coca-Cola’ proposed takeover of Huiyuan, Coca-Cola Realize 
different corporate governance systems 
As being one of the largest corporations in the United States, Coca-Cocla Company is 
best known for its flagship product Coca-Cola, invented by pharmacist John Stith 
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Pemberton in 1886. The Coca-Cola formula and brand was bought in 1889 by Asa 
Candler who incorporated The Coca-Cola Company in 1892.111 With its more than 
hundred year history, Coca-cola is deeply rooted in Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance system which is a market-oriented system serving as a mechanism for 
independent shareholders to influence managerial decision-making. Stock and bond 
markets play an important role but the Anglo-Saxon system is primarily characterized 
by the external market for corporate control, also named as the takeover market. As a 
result, high compensation is based on a high level of performance. 
 
Beijing Huiyuan Beverage and Food Group Co., Ltd. is a large and modern group 
company engaged in producing and marketing fruit and vegetable juice and juice 
drinks, which is the leading beverage company in China. It was initially established as 
Shandong Zibo Huiyuan Company in 1992 by Mr. Zhu Xin Li in Shandong. Although 
Huiyuan has much international cooperation with FDI, it is rooted in Asia Pacific 
Relationship-Based corporate governance system. As Thomas Clarke pointed out 
that, “The countries of the Asia Pacific also have a cultural diversity with different 
political and legal structures, and social traditions. Not only does this make for 
significant national differences in corporate governance policy and practice, but many 
countries in Asia are still engaged in a process of institutional development. Most 
countries of the region have corporate governance system that are essentially based 
around close relationships, usually involving family control, and ongoing close 
relationships with creditors, suppliers, and the major customers. In some systems this 
is reinforced by close relations with regulators and state officials”112
 
In contrast to Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, Chinese corporate 
governance has weaker investor protection, yet local firms and stakeholders are 
assigned with more protection. Local firms’ dominant insiders with nontrivial cash 
                                                              
111 Coca‐cola history, Coca‐Cola timeline, Coca‐Cola heritage, Coca‐Cola Company official homepage: 
http://heritage.coca‐cola.com/
112 Clarke Thomas(2007) , International Corporate Governance, London and New York: Routledge, Chapter 6, Page 
200 
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flow rights and large private benefits in the firms that they control. This comparably 
high exposure, such as high bargaining power of labor unions, interventionist 
government, public opinion and competitors may lead the deal to be conservative in 
directing governance and decisions in cross-border M&A. Moreover, Chinese 
government prefers conservative corporate investment and reserves much power on 
constraining value-enhancing corporate risk-taking to protect their interests and 
domestic market, which may influence investment policy for their own benefit. 
 
Therefore, Coca-Cola employed its M&A strategy in order to maximize the value of 
shareholders, which is in compliance with Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, 
however, have failed to realize the key drivers in Chinese corporate governance 
concerning the bargaining power of labor unions, interventionist government, public 
opinion and competitors.  
 
Hypothesis 4: In Coca-Cola’ proposed takeover of Huiyuan, Coca-Cola profoundly 
understand government legislation and regulations 
Despite of company law and FID regulations in China, we have chosen the Anti-trust 
law for analysis. There are two reasons, firstly, Coca-Cola has been operating in 
China for 30 years with its profound understanding of traditional Chinese legislation 
and regulations; secondly, this proposed deal was rejected by Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce and there were no all legal progress implemented.  
 
Coca-Cola Co.'s $2.4 billion offer to acquire China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd. is the 
first major test of China's new antitrust law which took effect last one month before 
announcement and attempts to streamline and standardize the government's antitrust 
activities. Previously, there is no unifying law on the books, and several agencies had 
a say in matters of general competition and mergers in China. Because of this deal, it 
comes amid public concern over the loss of national brands. 
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 In the announcement published on 18th March 2009, Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
declared that Coca-Cola’s purchase of China’s Huiyuan fails to pass antimonopoly 
review. Statements are following, 
? First, if this deal proved, Coca-Cola will control approximately 60% market share 
carbonated market, since its control on carbonated market, especially in 
distribution network of the market, will be transferred to juice market. This will 
result in Coca-Cola’ absolute monopoly in Chinese beverage market. 
? Second, because Coca-Cola and Huiyuan are dominantly leading beverage brands 
in China, the integration of both will induce pressure and distress on new entrants 
to Chinese beverage market. 
? Third, 100% of absolute stake control has negative impact on the development 
and innovations of small and medium sized firms, which can harm the Chinese 
industry going on sound progress and the interests of consumers. 
 
Coca-Cola, has followed the regulations in China and proposed this deal to Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce. However, it did not make any efficient solutions and positive 
response on the rejection afterwards. Thus, Coca-cola’s strategy on this deal was not 
well prepared for this new antitrust law. More importantly, in contrast to Vodafone’s 
positive attempts after the rejection on its bid for Mannesmann, Coca-cola’s 
conservative responses implies that there could have opposition from Coca-Cola’s 
board on this deal from the beginning. 
Hypothesis 5: In Coca-Cola’ proposed takeover of Huiyuan, Coca-Cola Take care 
the interest of external stakeholders 
As the development of the international economy and increasingly intense 
competition, the stakeholders, such as creditors, customers, suppliers, special interest 
group and the community, have the same bargaining power as internal stakeholders in 
decision making progress. In Coca-Cola and Huiyuan’s deal, public pressure have 
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influenced the progress, and its external stakeholders might be within the public 
groups that holds different anxious or opinions on this deal. 
? Creditors who dominates the company’s ability to repay their debts, This deal is 
worth $2.4 billion US dollar in cash, which became the largest in Chinese M&A 
history and the second largest M&A in US. Because of the big change for both 
companies in a form of foreign invested M&A，Coca-Cola’s creditors might have 
anxious about solvency of this buyout and financial performance of the integrated 
firm. 
? Customers’ opinions of M&A though are merely subjective opinions, customers 
typically have their own motives and behaviors and may use merger 
investigations to obtain “sweetheart deals” from their suppliers. Their opposition 
to mergers may be based more on fears about change or uncertainty. However, in 
China, customers would have a protectionism emotion on its favorite domestic 
brand against foreign ones.  
? Supplier are interested in the continuance of the company treat their suppliers 
with understanding and ensure that they settle their debts on time to maintain the 
confidence of these providers. In contrast to customers and creditors, Coca-Cola 
and Huiyuan’s deal might benefit suppliers. If the deal was implemented, the 
supply chain of both companies could be diversified and optimized, which can 
create more possibilities of cooperation. 
? Community are in the interest of sustained employment levels and welfare, and 
act in an environmentally friendly way. In M&A, it is very often to see 
job-cutting and management layoff. Both Coca-Coca and Huiyuan are large-sized 
company, for optimization and stake control purposes, restructuring is inevitable. 
Communities have power to impact foreign investor on protection local labour 
rights. It is not surprised they hold oposit opinion on this cross-border M&A. 
? Government holds stake in ensuring the companies act in a socially responsible 
way taking account of socially, ethical and environmental considerations, and 
analyzing corporate trends for various purposes such as employment levels, 
monetary policy, and market supply and demand of goods and services. 
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Coca-Cola and Huiyuan’s deal was finally rejected of the new Chinese Antitrust 
law. Chinese government who was the final decision maker plays an important 
role. As discussed in previous section, in Asian Pacific corporate governance 
system government will control the interests from the market overall interests 
such as competition and antitrust. In order to reserve its interests, regulations and 
legislations are the tool of governments to protect its domestic market. 
 
Coca-Cola is under Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system which mainly asserts 
shareholders value, while neglecting the stakeholder interests based Chinese corporate 
governance system. And it did not realize that the opposition from those external 
stakeholders will determine if the deal can be accomplished in China. 
Hypothesis 6: In Coca-Cola’ proposed takeover of Huiyuan, Coca-Cola is vigilant 
of media function and public pressure 
As with past cross-border deals, government leaders will ultimately determine 
whether a deal goes through. They may face public pressure to keep a domestic brand 
in local hands. In China, as in other countries, this means that the final decision could 
be influenced by public opinion, which can in turn be driven behind the scenes by 
opponents of the deal. If the parties involved in the takeover were not able to 
managing public perceptions, the odds of obtaining a favorable result may likely be 
stacked against the deal. 
 
On 3rd September 2008, The Wall Street Journal states that “Gauging public sentiment 
in China is difficult, but according to an online poll conducted by Chinese Web site 
Sina.com, 82% of more than 40,000 respondents oppose Coke's purchase of 
Huiyuan.”113 And on 8th of September 2008, a group of domestic soft drink makers 
sought to submit a proposal to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in a bid to block 
the takeover.  
                                                              
113 Rick Carew, Sky Canaves, Coke Deal To Test China's New Antitrust Law, The Wall Street Journal, September 5, 
2008 
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 Coca-Cola’s takeover of Huiyuan has raised public opposition. It can be inferred that 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce has taken public opinion into consideration to torpedo 
a deal that might pose as a “destroyer” of the domestic market. With no positive 
response or communication to the media and public opposition, Coca-Cola was again 
conservative, and left the adjudication to Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Coca-Cola 
might have predicted pressure from the public and media, however, it did not realize 
the media function and public pressure can determine if the deal can be accomplished.  
 
Chapter 8 A refined conceptual corporate 
governance framework in cross-border 
M&A 
Following the analysis of Coca-Cola and Huiyuan by the conceptual framework of 
Chapter 6; we have five new findings of corporate governance problems besides the 
issues in the framework. To refine this conceptual framework, these five new findings 
will be supplemented.  
8.1 New Findings from Coca-Cola and Huiyuan’s deal  
By presenting previous two sections, Coca-cola and Huiyuan’s deal has been analyzed 
based on the framework in Chapter 6, and this framework has covered most evidence 
appeared in this case study. In addition to the corporate governance problems 
investigated in the framework, there are new findings emerged in this case study as 
well. In order to refine the framework in this chapter, those new findings are 
categorized into two groups, internal Governance and external Governance, in 
compliance with the structure of the framework in Chapter 6. 
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New finding 1: Self-interests of CEO  
It is reported that Mr. Zhu Xinli will get 7.4biliion HK Dollars114 if the transaction 
with Coca-Cola could be carried out. Accordingly, it is suspected that Mr. Zhu 
decided to accept the offer owing to pursuing his own interests for getting a large 
income package. Moreover, in this M&A matter, there was a rumor that considering 
such an old age, the CEO of the target company Huiyuan Mr. Zhu preferred to take a 
rest and get away from the large pressure from the outside. It is understood that the 
enterprisers are very hard and tired especially doing business in China, which has the 
most furious competition and the greatest stress among the world.  
 
New finding 2: Competition 
Competition is a new finding in Coca-Cola and Huiyuan’s deal. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, competitiveness is the main driver in global economy as well as in M&A. 
The intention of Coca-Cola’s takeover of Huiyuan is also aiming at maximizing 
shareholder value by enhancing competitive advantages, the main driver behind M&A, 
so is in cross-border.  
 
In this case, Huiyuan has taken 46% of the pure juice market share, 39.8% of the 
nectar market share, and 10% of the fruit and vegetable juice market. Coca-Cola 
already claims over half of China’s soft drink market, and around a 10% share in the 
fruit and vegetable juice market, but has yet to make inroads selling pure juice. If the 
deal was approved, the combined corporation would have generated great synergies 
financially and operationally. Resources, assets, supply chain and distribution 
channels can be consolidated and optimized. As a consequence, the Chinese beverage 
market probably is dominant by Coca-Cola and Huiyuan. 
 
                                                              
114 China.com.cn, 9th September, http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2008‐09/09/content_16414617.htm 
China Agriculture Information website, 15th October 2008, http://information.zgppny.com/info52302.shtml   
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The Chinese Ministry of Commerce also took this into consideration. As it declared in 
announcement, new Chinese Antitrust law will prevent Coca-Cola from its absolute 
monopoly in Chinese beverage market, protect new entrants to Chinese beverage 
market from pressure and distress induced by this takeover, and protect the interests 
and rights of medium and small-sized domestic juice firms.  
 
Competitiveness is the pushing hand behind M&A; however, the Antitrust Law 
protects external stakeholders from emerged monopoly in unbalanced competition. 
Therefore, in cross-border M&A, corporations should not only seek competitiveness 
regardless the unfavorable impacts on relationship-based and stakeholder-concerned 
corporate governance systems. In case of unbalanced competition, regulations and 
public voice will induce protection the interest and right of local stakes, which might 
seriously block the M&A. 
New finding 3: Competitors 
Followed competition, competitors are taken account into external governance of the 
framework. As discussed in previous section competition is one of the aspects of 
macro-economics, however, the evidence in Coca-Cola and Huiyuan merger has 
showed that it affects the interests and relationship of external stakeholders, such as 
competitors. Since external stakeholders are one of the major stake groups in 
corporate governance, we include this aspect as a component of the interests of 
external stakeholders in the framework 
 
As presented in the section of timeline of events of this case, on 8th September 2008, a 
group of domestic soft drink makers sought to submit a proposal to the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce in a bid to block the takeover. Accompany with the public 
opposition, it can be inferred that competitors would use all available methods and 
resources, be it politicizing the nationalist sentiment, or lobbying with government 
authorities, to torpedo a deal that might pose a threat to their very own survival. 
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 Interests of competitors play an important role in cross-border M&A, which might 
influence the opinion of the final decision maker, the government. Therefore, in 
relationship based or stakeholder based corporate governance countries, should adopt 
a coordinate strategy that acquire and control the target's stake slowly in stead of 
100% at once.   
New finding 4: Nationalism 
The nationalism takes place both as resistance to foreign acquirers and as support for 
domestic ones. Cross-border M&A conflicts can be resulted from nationalism.  
 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are an important part of a market economy. Large 
firms often enter into a new market through acquisitions of local firms. If there is 
excess capacity in a sector, firms also often exit the economy not through bankruptcy 
but by being acquired by another firm.  
 
In Coca-Cola and Huiyuan case, synergies would be huge if those to firms integrated. 
The combined group would have strong bargaining power in domestic market. The 
merger would create absolute control on supply chain and distribution channel which 
are inter-transferable between the two corporations. However, External stakeholders 
including government, communities and competitors may have nationalism and 
protectionism emotions on domestic economy. On the other hand, nationalists insists 
on keep the domestic firm in hands of Chinese, since Coca-Cola’s takeover with 
hundred percent of Huiyuan stake gets too much public attention. 
 
Managing nationalism of the host country is an important prerequisite in cross-border 
M&A. Since it involves the emotions of major external stakeholders, corporations 
should take nationalism into consideration in advance to estimate the riskiness 
incurred by it. In addition, nationalism is not able to be eliminated in some countries, 
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so corporations should understand the reasons behind and adjust the M&A strategy to 
comfort domestic stakeholders. In our refined framework, nationalism will be taken 
into the external governance. 
 
8.2 The refined conceptual corporate governance 
framework: 
By combining the framework constructed in Chapter 6 and the new findings of 
corporate governance problems in Coca-Cola and Huiyuan case study, we refine the 
conceptual framework as following. 
 
Figure 2  A refined conceptual corporate governance framework 
  Merger and acquisition 
Corporate 
Governance   
Synergy Market power Control of penetration 
Problem: Directors are always compliant with management, not 
properly take the oversight role.  
Board of directors   Solution: Directors should remember to ask questions, be 
sensitive to the type of information that indicates increased risks or 
negative trends, track M&A activities of the company they are 
serving, seek multiple sources of information.   
Problem: Audit quality affects the accuracy of financial results, 
risk assessment etc.; Employees if not perform well, will erode the 
anticipated synergy, weaken the market power, even lose 
competitiveness; A reasonless executive compensation structure 
will increase the conflicts of interests between owners and 
managers, negatively affect corporate performance which is 
related to market share, control of penetration  etc.  
Internal 
Internal 
self-regulation 
mechanism(Auditors, 
employees, executive 
compensation 
structure)  
Solution: Companies should enhance companies' internal 
self-regulation mechanism--independent auditors, 
employee-ownership, and maintain a sustaining friendly 
relationship with employees, toughen pay-for-performance 
metrics.  
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Problem: may 
overestimate the 
synergy gains of the 
potential merger. 
Problem: 
inadequate 
post-merger 
planning causes 
M&A failures, bad 
performance, the 
decrease of market 
share, shrink 
international 
coverage  etc.  
Problem: managers 
always stay on the 
same level, may 
lead to the loss of 
competitive 
advantage as more 
and more entrants 
enter such 
contestable markets 
quickly.  
Managerial 
overconfidence  
Solution: Managers should overcome overconfidence especially in 
high-risk cross-border M&A; board of directors should prevent 
and keep alert of managerial overconfidence.  
Problem: shareholders' different interests, may exaggerate the 
potential synergy, impact the decision whether to M&A or not.   
Shareholders  Solution: More communication with shareholders is needed for 
managers; the decision-making process going transparency is the 
trend to meet the information needs from shareholders.  
Problem: culture clash in the combined company may erode the 
anticipated synergy savings.  organizational 
culture  Solution: Managers should recognize organizational culture 
differences and take into account when making decisions.  
Problem: pursue his own interests, personal factors such as old 
age to retire. CEO  
Solution: Corporations should introduce an independent party or 
organization to supervise CEO.  
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
generating synergy. 
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
gaining market 
power. 
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
controlling 
penetration. Country norms and 
value Solution: management should understand target’s host country’s 
culture, such as value and ethics that will determine the nature of a 
corporate management style, governance and communication 
custom, and decision makers’ interests and behavior etc. to 
process the cross-border M&A smoothly. 
Problem: Almost every M&A activities even not really happened 
(rumors, news, announcement about possible M&A) would induce 
the fluctuation of stock price of participant companies, so would 
financial crisis.  Stock market 
Solution: Company participants should be  aware of the reaction 
of stock market as corporations' external control.  
External 
corporate governance Problem: pre-condition of cross-border M&A. 
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systems Solution: management should acknowledge the other firm’s 
corporate governance system base and coordinate its strategy to 
favor the interest of domestic parties, in order to avoid a culture 
clash among different corporate governance systems. 
Problem: prerequisite of cross-border M&A approval. Government 
legislation and 
regulations 
Solution:  cross-border M&A should be constructed or adjusted 
in compliance with the host countries’ regulations. 
Problem: external 
stakeholders' 
behaviors determine 
if M&A gains 
anticipated synergy. 
Problem: entry 
barriers External 
stakeholders’ 
opposition might 
dilute the market 
power. 
Problem: external 
stakeholders may 
fear of the change of 
integration, and 
conserved of their 
behaviors and 
decisions. 
Interest of external 
stakeholders 
Solution: 
management should 
optimize the 
interests and 
benefits of 
customers, creditors 
and suppliers in 
M&A to save  
costs and increase 
market shares 
Solution: 
management should 
employ product 
differentiation 
strategy and 
sustaining R&D to 
reach a dominant 
position in the 
market 
Solution: 
management should 
build up confidences 
of external 
stakeholders and 
sustaining 
relationship with 
them. 
Problem: pre-condition of cross-border M&A. 
Media function and 
public pressure 
Solution: management should communicate with the media and 
govern itself on its activities, in order to convince the society to 
perceive the corporation and its activities as a “responsible 
citizen” and will not harm the interests and benefits of the 
domestic parties. 
Problem: enormous 
synergy will threat 
the growth of small 
and medium sized  
firms in the industry, 
which is restricted 
by regulations of 
some 
stakeholder-based 
corporate 
governance 
Problem: dominant 
market share will 
magnify the control 
of market and 
induce unbalanced 
competition and 
monopoly. 
Problem: 
unbalanced 
competition will 
threats the survival 
of the peers by 
dominating the 
distribution channel 
Competition 
Solution: corporations should not only seek competitiveness 
regardless the unfavorable impacts on relationship-based and 
stakeholder-concerned corporate governance systems and consider 
the interest and right of local stakes, since Antitrust law might 
seriously block the M&A. 
Problem: in relationship-based and stakeholder-concerned 
corporate governance countries, antitrust law will reject the M&A 
if there was a threat to the survival of the industry peers. 
Competitors 
(Competitor is a 
corporation's 
external stakeholder. 
Since it functions 
differently than other 
external 
stakeholders, this 
framework will 
present as an 
independent factor) 
Solution: In this kind of corporate governance, corporations 
should first follow the antitrust regulations and adopt a coordinate 
strategy that acquire and control the target's stake slowly in stead 
of 100% at once. 
Problem: prerequisite of cross-border M&A approval, and 
nationalism can induce the public voice and government 
intervention. 
Nationalism Solution: corporations should take nationalism into consideration 
in advance to estimate the riskiness incurred by it. Nationalism is 
not able to be eliminated in some countries, so corporations should 
understand the reasons behind and adjust the M&A strategy to 
comfort domestic stakeholders. 
 
 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion  
This paper began with a brief description of the event that on March 18, 2009, the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce rejected the Coca-Cola Company’s $2.4 billion bid 
for China’s top juice maker, Huiyuan Juice Group. We chose to open with that topic 
because the Coca-Cola and Huiyuan matter is kind of similar with some merger cases 
happened during the recent merger wave, for example, Vodafone-Mannesmann, 
Daimler-Chrysler, Pepsi-Danone. No matter whether these multinational M&A 
activities succeed or not finally, we see that a common theme that they share is 
corporate governance. Good corporate governance is a key to the integration of 
corporations, financial institutions and markets, and central to the health of our 
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economies.  
 
Successful multinational M&A are not easy, there are many factors needed to consider 
for participants in cross-border M&A transactions. In addition to traditional corporate 
governance factors, which mainly embody board of directors, managers and 
stakeholders and so on, some other factors such as country norms and value, 
government legislation and regulation, public pressure and media are also vital 
important for conducting a prosperous cross-border M&A business.  
 
To answer this paper aim: a conceptual corporate governance framework about 
problems and solutions is constructed in conjunction with cross-border M&A. We try 
our best to make that framework more comprehensive and useful through reading a 
lot of previous literatures and studying some empirical cases. Due to the limitation of 
time, we engaged in investigating 5 major international M&A cases in total. By 
testing in Coca-Cola and Huiyuan deal, some new findings are added and a revised 
framework is set up for firms who are interested in or currently working on 
cross-border M&A activities.  
 
There has been much discussion of corporate governance in public over the past 
decades. Much of this attention has been captured by many accounting scandals such 
as those that happened at Enron, WorldCom. This has led to changes in laws and 
accounting rules in order to achieve more accurate reporting of financial data to 
markets. However, there has been much less focus on changes in governance related 
to cross-border M&A. Given the recent M&A failures, a further research on this 
aspect of corporate governance could be helpful.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1 A conceptual corporate governance framework 
Figure 1 A conceptual corporate governance framework 
  Merger and acquisition 
Corporate 
Governance   
Synergy Market power Control of penetration 
Problem: Directors are always compliant with management, not 
properly take the oversight role.  
Board of directors   Solution: Directors should remember to ask questions, be sensitive 
to the type of information that indicates increased risks or negative 
trends, track M&A activities of the company they are serving, seek 
multiple sources of information.   
Problem: Audit quality affects the accuracy of financial results, risk 
assessment etc.; Employees if not perform well, will erode the 
anticipated synergy, weaken the market power, even lose 
competitiveness; A reasonless executive compensation structure will 
increase the conflicts of interests between owners and managers, 
negatively affect corporate performance which is related to market 
share, control of penetration  etc.  
Internal 
self-regulation 
mechanism(Auditors, 
employees, executive 
compensation 
structure)  Solution: Companies should enhance companies' internal 
self-regulation mechanism--independent auditors, 
employee-ownership, and maintain a sustaining friendly relationship 
with employees, toughen pay-for-performance metrics.  
Problem: may 
overestimate the 
synergy gains of 
the potential 
merger. 
Problem: 
inadequate 
post-merger 
planning causes 
M&A failures, bad 
performance, the 
decrease of market 
share, shrink 
international 
coverage etc.  
Problem: managers 
always stay on the same 
level, may lead to the loss 
of competitive advantage 
as more and more entrants 
enter such contestable 
markets quickly.  
Managerial 
overconfidence  
Solution: Managers should overcome overconfidence especially in 
high-risk cross-border M&A; board of directors should prevent and 
keep alert of managerial overconfidence.  
Internal 
Shareholders  Problem: shareholders' different interests, may exaggerate the 
potential synergy, impact the decision whether to M&A or not.  
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Solution: More communication with shareholders is needed for 
managers; the decision-making process going transparency is the 
trend to meet the information needs from shareholders.  
Problem: culture clash in the combined company may erode the 
anticipated synergy savings.  organizational 
culture  Solution: Managers should recognize organizational culture 
differences and take into account when making decisions.  
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
generating 
synergy. 
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
gaining market 
power. 
Problem: pre-condition of 
controlling penetration. 
Country norms and 
value Solution: management should understand target’s host country’s 
culture, such as value and ethics that will determine the nature of a 
corporate management style, governance and communication 
custom, and decision makers’ interests and behavior etc. to process 
the cross-border M&A smoothly. 
Problem: Almost every M&A activities even not really happened 
(rumors, news, announcement about possible M&A) would induce 
the fluctuation of stock price of participant companies, so would 
financial crisis.  Stock market 
Solution: Company participants should be aware of the reaction of 
stock market as corporations' external control.  
Problem: pre-condition of cross-border M&A. 
corporate governance 
systems 
Solution: management should acknowledge the other firm’s 
corporate governance system base and coordinate its strategy to 
favor the interest of domestic parties, in order to avoid a culture 
clash among different corporate governance systems. 
Problem: prerequisite of cross-border M&A approval. Government 
legislation and 
regulations 
Solution:  cross-border M&A should be constructed or adjusted in 
compliance with the host countries’ regulations. 
External 
Interest of external 
stakeholders 
Problem: 
external 
stakeholders' 
behaviors 
determine if 
M&A gains 
anticipated 
synergy. 
Problem: entry 
barriers External 
stakeholders’ 
opposition might 
dilute the market 
power. 
Problem: external 
stakeholders may fear of 
the change of integration, 
and conserved of their 
behaviors and decisions. 
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Solution: 
management 
should optimize 
the interests and 
benefits of 
customers, 
creditors and 
suppliers in 
M&A to save  
costs and 
increase market 
shares 
Solution: 
management should 
employ product 
differentiation 
strategy and 
sustaining R&D to 
reach a dominant 
position in the 
market 
Solution: management 
should build up 
confidences of external 
stakeholders and sustaining 
relationship with them. 
Problem: pre-condition of cross-border M&A. 
Media function and 
public pressure 
Solution: management should communicate with the media and 
govern itself on its activities, in order to convince the society to 
perceive the corporation and its activities as a “responsible citizen” 
and will not harm the interests and benefits of the domestic parties. 
 
Figure 2 A refined conceptual corporate governance 
framework  
Figure 2  A refined conceptual corporate governance framework 
  Merger and acquisition 
Corporate 
Governance 
  
Synergy Market power Control of penetration 
Problem: Directors are always compliant with management, 
not properly take the oversight role.  
Board of directors   Solution: Directors should remember to ask questions, be 
sensitive to the type of information that indicates increased 
risks or negative trends, track M&A activities of the company 
they are serving, seek multiple sources of information.   
Internal 
Internal 
self-regulation 
mechanism(Auditors, 
employees, executive 
compensation 
structure)  
Problem: Audit quality affects the accuracy of financial results, 
risk assessment etc.; Employees if not perform well, will erode 
the anticipated synergy, weaken the market power, even lose 
competitiveness; A reasonless executive compensation 
structure will increase the conflicts of interests between owners 
and managers, negatively affect corporate performance which 
is related to market share, control of penetration  etc.  
  103
Solution: Companies should enhance companies' internal 
self-regulation mechanism--independent auditors, 
employee-ownership, and maintain a sustaining friendly 
relationship with employees, toughen pay-for-performance 
metrics.  
Problem: may 
overestimate the 
synergy gains of 
the potential 
merger. 
Problem: 
inadequate 
post-merger 
planning causes 
M&A failures, bad 
performance, the 
decrease of market 
share, shrink 
international 
coverage  etc.  
Problem: 
managers always 
stay on the same 
level, may lead to 
the loss of 
competitive 
advantage as more 
and more entrants 
enter such 
contestable 
markets quickly.  
Managerial 
overconfidence  
Solution: Managers should overcome overconfidence 
especially in high-risk cross-border M&A; board of directors 
should prevent and keep alert of managerial overconfidence.  
Problem: shareholders' different interests, may exaggerate the 
potential synergy, impact the decision whether to M&A or not.  
Shareholders  Solution: More communication with shareholders is needed for 
managers; the decision-making process going transparency is 
the trend to meet the information needs from shareholders.  
Problem: culture clash in the combined company may erode 
the anticipated synergy savings.  organizational 
culture  Solution: Managers should recognize organizational culture 
differences and take into account when making decisions.  
Problem: pursue his own interests, personal factors such as old 
age to retire. CEO  
Solution: Corporations should introduce an independent party 
or organization to supervise CEO.  
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
generating 
synergy. 
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
gaining market 
power. 
Problem: 
pre-condition of 
controlling 
penetration. Country norms and 
value Solution: management should understand target’s host 
country’s culture, such as value and ethics that will determine 
the nature of a corporate management style, governance and 
communication custom, and decision makers’ interests and 
behavior etc. to process the cross-border M&A smoothly. 
External 
Stock market 
Problem: Almost every M&A activities even not really 
happened (rumors, news, announcement about possible M&A) 
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would induce the fluctuation of stock price of participant 
companies, so would financial crisis.  
Solution: Company participants should be aware of the 
reaction of stock market as corporations' external control.  
Problem: pre-condition of cross-border M&A. 
corporate governance 
systems 
Solution: management should acknowledge the other firm’s 
corporate governance system base and coordinate its strategy to 
favor the interest of domestic parties, in order to avoid a culture 
clash among different corporate governance systems. 
Problem: prerequisite of cross-border M&A approval. Government 
legislation and 
regulations 
Solution:  cross-border M&A should be constructed or 
adjusted in compliance with the host countries’ regulations. 
Problem: external 
stakeholders' 
behaviors 
determine if M&A 
gains anticipated 
synergy. 
Problem: entry 
barriers External 
stakeholders’ 
opposition might 
dilute the market 
power. 
Problem: external 
stakeholders may 
fear of the change 
of integration, and 
conserved of their 
behaviors and 
decisions. 
Interest of external 
stakeholders 
Solution: 
management 
should optimize 
the interests and 
benefits of 
customers, 
creditors and 
suppliers in M&A 
to save  costs and 
increase market 
shares 
Solution: 
management should 
employ product 
differentiation 
strategy and 
sustaining R&D to 
reach a dominant 
position in the 
market 
Solution: 
management 
should build up 
confidences of 
external 
stakeholders and 
sustaining 
relationship with 
them. 
Problem: pre-condition of cross-border M&A. 
Media function and 
public pressure 
Solution: management should communicate with the media 
and govern itself on its activities, in order to convince the 
society to perceive the corporation and its activities as a 
“responsible citizen” and will not harm the interests and 
benefits of the domestic parties. 
Competition 
Problem: 
enormous synergy 
will threat the 
growth of small 
and medium sized  
firms in the 
industry, which is 
Problem: dominant 
market share will 
magnify the control 
of market and 
induce unbalanced 
competition and 
monopoly. 
Problem: 
unbalanced 
competition will 
threats the survival 
of the peers by 
dominating the 
distribution 
restricted by 
regulations of 
some 
stakeholder-based 
corporate 
governance 
channel 
Solution: corporations should not only seek competitiveness 
regardless the unfavorable impacts on relationship-based and 
stakeholder-concerned corporate governance systems and 
consider the interest and right of local stakes, since Antitrust 
law might seriously block the M&A. 
Problem: in relationship-based and stakeholder-concerned 
corporate governance countries, antitrust law will reject the 
M&A if there was a threat to the survival of the industry peers. 
Competitors 
(Competitor is a 
corporation's 
external stakeholder. 
Since it functions 
differently than other 
external 
stakeholders, this 
framework will 
present as an 
independent factor) 
Solution: In this kind of corporate governance, corporations 
should first follow the antitrust regulations and adopt a 
coordinate strategy that acquire and control the target's stake 
slowly in stead of 100% at once. 
Problem: prerequisite of cross-border M&A approval and 
nationalism can induce the public voice and government 
intervention. 
Nationalism Solution: corporations should take nationalism into 
consideration in advance to estimate the riskiness incurred by 
it. Nationalism is not able to be eliminated in some countries, 
so corporations should understand the reasons behind and 
adjust the M&A strategy to comfort domestic stakeholders. 
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